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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency-Criminal Liability of Corporation-Imputation
of Agents' Knowledge
Defendant trucking corporation was convicted of knowingly and will-
fully keeping false driver's logs in violation of a federal statute. The
evidence indicated wide discrepancies between the false logs and the
trip reports, both of which records were prepared by defendant's driver.1
No single agent of the corporation other than the driver knew of these
discrepancies, but one agent had knowledge of the information in the
logs, and another knew the contents of the trip reports. Although re-
versing the conviction on other grounds, the court of appeals ruled that
the partial information possessed by both agents could be attributed to
the corporation to give it knowledge of the falsity of the logs.2
It was once held that a corporation could not commit a crime,2 but
now corporate bodies can be convicted for acts of misfeasance, 4 violations
of statutes, 5 and crimes involving general and specific criminal intent,6
although some writers have criticized the last extension of criminal re-
sponsibility.7 Because a corporation can act only through its agents or
employees, rules of agency have been used in varying degree to attribute
the nmens rea or guilty knowledge to the corporation in crimes involving
intent.s Generally, a sweeping application of the doctrine of respondeat
1 Whether the driver in falsifying the logs was attempting to further the in-
terests of his employer or to perpetrate a scheme to defraud them was not indi-
cated by the facts or discussed in the opinion.
'Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F. 2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951).
'McDaniel v. Gates City Gas Light Co., 79 Ga. 58, 61 (1887) ; State v. Great
Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41 (1841) ; Anonymous, 12 Mod. 559, 88 Eng.
Rep. 1518 (K. B. 1701).
SE.g., Stewart v. Waterloo Turn Verein, 71 Iowa 226, 32 N. W. 275 (1887);
State v. Western North Carolina R. R., 95 N. C. 602 (1886).
.g., Groff v. State, 171 Ind. 547, 85 N. E. 769 (1908); Commonwealth v.
Sacks, 214 Mass. 72, 100 N. E. 1019 (1913).
'E.g., Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 Fed. 926 (8th Cir. 1914),
aff'd, 236 U. S. 531 (1915) (conspiracy to bring liquor into Indian territory);
Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445 (1899)
(criminal contempt) ; State v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 90 N. J. L. 372, 103 AtI. 695
(1917), aff'd, 94 N. J. L. 171, 111 Atl. 257 (1920) (manslaughter); People v.
Canadian Fur Trappers Corp., 248 N. Y. 159, 161 N. E. 455 (1928) (larceny);
State v. Salisbury Ice & Fuel Co., 166 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 737 (1914) (false pre-
tenses) ; State v. Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N. C. 610, 69 S. E. 58 (1910) (willful
destruction of property). See Hildebrand, Corporate Liability for Torts and
Crimes, 13 TEXAs L. REV. 253, 272 (1935).
SBALLENTINE, CoRPoRATIoNs §114 (Rev. ed. 1946); Francis, Criminal Respon-
sibility of the Corporation, 18 ILL. L. REv. 305 (1924) ; Canfield, Corporate Re-
sponsibility for Crime, 14 CoL. L. REv. 469 (1914).
'See New York Central & H. R. R. R. v. United States, 212 U. S. 481 (1909);
Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F. 2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Overland Cotton Mill
Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 75 Pac. 924 (1904) ; State v. Salisbury Ice & Fuel Co.,
166 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 737 (1914).
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superior has been withheld.9 Courts will impute to the corporation the
knowledge and intent of its officers,10 and, in some cases, that of its
superior agents acting within the scope of their employment ;11 but they
generally do not impute the intent of an ordinary employee unless his
superior had knowledge of such intent 12 or acquiesced in it.13 Lack of
consent is a defense in almost all cases.14
There has been a growing tendency, however, to broaden the area
of corporate criminal liability, and to hold the company for deeds which
were done by any of its agents acting within the scope of their employ-
ment,' 5 especially in cases where the public welfare is involved. 16 It
is said that public necessity requires that the corporation have a non-
delegable duty to prevent violations of the law by its agents. 17 Conse-
8 People v. Jarvis, 135 Cal. App. 288, 27 P. 2d 77 (1933), cert. denied, 291 U. S.
648 (1934); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 153 Mass. 421, 26 N. E. 992 (1891);
People v. Raphael, 190 Misc. 584, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 748 (N. Y. City Ct. 1947). This
restraint on the part of the courts comes from the feeling that "... . it is of the very
essence of our deep-rooted notions of criminal liability that guilt be personal and
individual... ." Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARv.
L. REv. 689, 717 (1930).
"United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F. 2d 16 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Minin-
sohn v. United States, 101 F. 2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939).
1 United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F. 2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948) ; C. I. T. Corp.
v. United States, 150 F. 2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945). "The federal courts seem to em-
phasize the relative position of the agent in the fact pattern without regard to his
rank in the corporate hierarchy." Gallin, Corporate Criminal Liability, 4 LAW
AxD L. N. 3, 5 (fall, 1950).
1 People v. Raphael, 190 Misc. 584, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 748 (N. Y. City Ct. 1947).
The courts, however, will often readily infer such knowledge from the general
circumstances of the case. E.g., Paschen v. United States, 70 F. 2d 491, 503 (7th
Cir. 1934); Zito v. United States, 64 F. 2d 772 (7th Cir. 1933) ; United States v.
Wilson, 59 F. 2d 97 (W. D. Wash. 1932); United States v. Houghton, 14 Fed.
544 (D. N. J. 1882).
13 Grant Bros. Const. Co. v. United States, 13 Ariz. 388, 144 Pac. 955 (1911),
aff'd, 232 U. S. 647 (1913) ; 19 C. J. S. 1075 (1940).
14 Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F. 2d 2 (2d Cir. 1946); John
Gund Brewing Co. v. United States, 204 Fed. 17 (8th Cir. 1913). But orders
forbidding such acts must have been given in good faith, United States v. Wilson,
59 F. 2d 97 (W. D. Wash. 1932); THOMPSON, LAW OF COPORAnONS §5645 (3d
ed. 1927).
"
5 United States v. Parfait Powder Puff Co., 163 F. 2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1947);
United States v. George Fish, Inc., 154 F. 2d 798 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U. S.
869 (1946); Egan v. United States, 13 F. 2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U. S.
788 (1943); Regan v. Kroger Groccry and Baking Co., 386 Ill. 284, 54 N. E. 2d
210 (1944); State v. Louisville and N. R. R., 91 Tenn. 445, 19 S. W. 229 (1892) ;
Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 194 Wis. 636, 217 N. W. 412 (1928). This approach is
urged in Edgerton, Corporate Criinawl Responsibility, 36 YALE L. J. 827, 835
(1927.)
18 "Within this field the machinery of criminal administration is utilized as an
enforcing agency because the social interest far outweighs the individual's interest."
Note, 60 HARV. L. Rrv. 283, 285 (1946). See Dotterweich v. United States, 320
U. S. 277 (1943) ; Zito v. United States, 64 F. 2d 772 (7th Cir. 1933) ; Golden
Guernsey Farms, Inc. v. State, 223 Ind. 606, 63 N. E. 2d 699 (1945).
" Actually, the non-delegable duty concept seems to create a type of absolute
liability closely akin to that imposed by the "dangerous instrumentality" rule in
agency cases in the tort field. Compare United States v. Illinois Central R. R., 303
U. S. 239 (1938); United States v. Wilson, 59 F. 2d 97 (W. D. Wash. 1932);
People v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N. Y. 25, 121 N. E. 474 (1918),
[Vol. 30
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quently, companies have been convicted where their agents acted with-
out the knowledge' 8 or, in a few cases, consent' 9 of their superiors, and
even against express orders and instructions. 20 In a few instances it
has been ruled that criminal liability can be imposed even when the
agent has deliberately acted adversely to the interests of the principal. 21
Into this confused area of law, the instant case22 injects a new fiction:
where knowledge is an ingredient of the crime, it can be found by im-
puting the sum total of the bits of information possessed by several
agents to the "mind" of the corporation, and if such information, by
fiction of the law integrated by the "corporate mind," gives notice of the
criminal act of an agent, the corporation has the necessary guilty knowl-
edge.
This theory is completely new to the field of criminal law. It is
unsupported by the language of New York Central & H. R. R. R. v.
United States,23 cited by the court to support the present decision. In
that case, the imputation of partial [italics added] knowledge was never
considered, the court merely holding the defendant railroad responsible
for the knowledge of two of its agents where both agents had complete
knowledge of the crime.
Examples of the use of the "corporate mind" fiction do appear, how-
ever, in some civil cases. In United States v. National Exchange
Bank,2 4 the knowledge of a disbursing clerk as to the amount of a check
drawn by him was imputed to his principal and when the check (which
had been raised afterwards by a third party) was paid by a different
agent, the claim by the principal of payment under a mistake of fact
was denied, the court holding that the drawer and drawee were the
same.25 There have been similar holdings, 26 based upon the legal iden-
with Richman Brothers Co. v. Miller, 131 Ohio St. 424, 3 N. E. 2d 360 (1936)
(tort case).
"8 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 146 Pa. Super. 328, 22 A. 2d 299 (1941), aff'd,
345 Pa. 456, 28 A. 2d 894 (1942). But see Comment, 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 557
(1947).
"o Regan v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., 386 Ill. 284, 54 N. E. 2d 210
(1944).
0 United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F. 2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948); Overland
Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 75 Pac. 924 (1904); State Bank v.
Potosi Tie and Lumber Co., 299 Ill. App. 524, 20 N. E. 2d 893 (1939).
2' Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d 905 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U. S. 734 (1945); accord, United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F. 2d
16 (7th Cir. 1949). But see 13 Am. Jtm. §1113 (1938).
-' Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F. 2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951).
-2212 U. S. 481 (1909).
2 270 U. S. 527 (1926).
r1d. at 534.
."Northwestern Nat. Bank v. Madison and Kedzie State Bank, 242 Ill. App.
22 (1926); German-American National Bank v. Kelley, 183 Iowa 269, 166 N. W.
1053 (1918); New England Trust Co. v. Bright, 274 Mass. 407, 17 N. E. 469(1931); Neal v. Cincinnati Union Stockyards Co., 1 0. C. C. (N. S.) 13 (1903) ;
London County Freehold and Leasehold Properties, Ltd. v. Berkeley Property and
Investment Co., 2 All E. R. 1039 (1936).
19521
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tity of principal and agent,27 but the theory has been sharply criticized
as one which adds innocent knowledge to innocent knowledge to get
guilty knowledge. 28 As a result, most of the courts that espouse this
approach do so with reservations, stating that before it will be imputed,
the information must be obtained by the agent acting within the scope
of his employment,29 that the agent must be involved in the transaction
in connection with which the information is to be imputed, 80 that the
information must appear important to the agent in regard to his 'duties,3 '
or that the agent must have reason to believe the information should be
reported or a duty to report it.32 Some decisions reject the "corporate
mind" fiction entirely, and impute partial knowledge of an agent only
to create estoppel against a principal seeking to obtain the benefits of
a transaction which he has consummated in whole or in part by means
of such agent.33
The conflict and complications which have been created by the use
of the "corporate mind" approach in civil cases would indicate that its
importation into criminal law is not advisable. If it is deemed bene-
ficial to broaden the criminal liability of corporations, a point of policy
on which there is considerable doubt,8 4 it would appear wiser to achieve
this end by increased application of the "non-delegable" duty &oncept,
with its standard of absolute liability for acts of an agent, than to fol-
low the circuitous route of conjuring up knowledge in the "mind" of
the corporation, when it is clear that in actuality no such knowledge and
no such "mind" exist.
JoHN G. GOLDINrG.
2" For an explanation of the rule and the policies upon which it is based, see
Neal v. Cincinnati Union Stockyards Co., spra note 25.
"Devlin, Fraudulent Misrepresentation: Division of Respoisibility betwectn
Principal and Agent, 53 L. Q. REv. 344, 362 (1937) ; Comment, 15 CAN. B. REV. 716
(1937).
' Solow v. General Motors Truck Co., 64 F. 2d 105 (2d Cir. 1933).
20 Congar v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 24 Wis. 157 (1869).
31 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, §275, comment d (1934).
32 Elgin, J. & E. R. R. v. United States, 253 Fed. 907 (7th Cir. 1918).
" Peebles v. Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233 (1877); Irvine v. Grady, 85
Tex. 120, 19 S. W. 1028 (1892).
" Punishment of the corporation itself by fine would not seem to be particu-
larly effective in deterring an employee from committing criminal acts (especially
in cases where the employee is deliberately acting adversely to the interests of his
employer) unless the threat of fine causes the company to exercise stricter control
over its employee. In addition, the reason for a broad application of respondeat
superior in the tort field, i.e., the need to compensate an innocent third party for
his losses, does not exist in the area of criminal responsibility. After all, any
fine levied on the corporation is ultimately passed on to its stockholders in the
form of lower profits or to the public in the form of higher prices. For further
discussion of this point, see BALLANTINE, COaRORAviONS §114 (Rev. ed. 1946);




Conditional Sales-Liability in Self-Help Repossessions
Plaintiff, a subscriber to defendant's telephone service, was delinquent
in his payments. An agent of the 'defendant obtained unauthorized en-
trance to plaintiff's apartment from one of the apartment employees and
removed the telephone. Plaintiff sued for wilful trespass. The South
Carolina federal district court, following cases involving repossession of
chattels sold under a conditional sales contract or chattel mortgage, found
for the defendant.1
The prevailing view as to rights and liabilities in actions for repos-
session of chattels is that the vendor has the right to repossess in the
event of default.2 The right is an irrevocable license to do whatever is
necessary to accomplish the repossession, including entry upon the
premises of the vendee. However, the retaking must be effected with-
out a breach of the peace. If it cannot be executed without breaching
the peace, the vendor must resort to the courts.3 The question in each
case, then, is, did the repossessing vendor commit a trespass or breach
of the peace? Because of the varied fact situations it is difficult to
formulate a set of rules; but by examining the holdings, it is possible to
define a guiding line in certain types of cases.
In cases involving trespass against land the vendor may enter the
vendee's land to repossess a conditionally sold chattel even in the absence
of a contractual stipulation to that effect.4 Where there is a contractual
provision, the privilege to enter is 'deemed irrevocable on the grounds
that it is a part of the consideration.5 However, the vendor will be held
liable for any act constituting a trespass or a breach of the peace. 6 Where
'Plate v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 98 F. Supp. 355 (E. D. S. C. 1951).
'Willis v. Whittle, 82 S. C. 500, 64 S. E. 410 (1909). Quoted with approval in
Day v. Nat. Bond & Investment Co., 99 S. W. 2d 117 (Mo. 1936); Lange v.
Midwest Motor Securities, 231 S. W. 272 (Mo. 1921) ; Bear v. Colonial Finance
Co., 42 Ohio App. 482, 182 N. E. 521 (1932); Westerman v. Oregon Automobile
Credit Corp., 168 Ore. 216, 122 P. 2d 435 (1942) ; Soulias v. Mills Novelty Co.
198 S. C. 355, 17 S. E. 2d 869 (1941); Hutchinson v. A. K. Brown Motors Ihc.,
191 S. C. 319, 4 S. E. 2d 268 (1939); Justus v. Universal Credit Qo., 189 S. C.
487, 15 S. E. 2d 508 (1939).
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §272-b (1934); 14 C. J. S., CHATTEL MORTGAGES
§185; UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT §16.
'Flaherty v. Ginsberg, 135 Iowa 743, 110 N. W. 1050 (1907); Lange v. Mid-
west Motor Securities, 231 S. W. 272 (Mo. 1921) ; Westerman v. Oregon Auto-
mobile Credit Corp. 168 Ore. 216, 122 P. 2d 435 (1942); Justus v. Universal
Credit Co., 189 S. C. 487, 1 S. E. 2d 508 (1939). Contra: Van Wrenn v. Flynn,
34 La. Ann. 1158 (1882) (The right to retake the property did not confer upon
the vendor the right to enter the house of the vendee in his absence, without his
consent or notice, and carry off the property). Carter v. Mintz & Goldblum, 8
So. 2d 709 (La. 1942); Luthy v. Philip Werlein Co., 163 La. 752, 112 So. 709
(1927).
'Walsh v. Taylor, 39 Md. 592 (1874); Lambert v. Robinson, 162 Mass. 34
(1894); First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Winter; 176 Okl. 400, 55 P. 2d 1029
(1936); Soulias v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S. C. 355, 17 S. E. 2d 869 (1941);
Justus v. Universal Credit Co., 189 S. C. 487, 1 S. E. 2d 508 (1939).
'American Discount Co. v. Wychroff, 29 Ala. App. 82, 191 So. 70 (1939);
Dooley v. West American Commercial Insurance Co., 133 Cal. App. 58, 23 P. 2d
1952]
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there is an actual forceful breaking-in, liability ensues, 7 including lia-
bility for damages suffered as a consequence of the act.s This is so
even where the contract of sale permits the use of force or where the
vendee waives his rights; the courts holding such stipulations as against
public policy.9 However, at least one court has allowed forceful re-
taking without liability.' 9
North Carolina is in accord with the general rule in allowing the
vendor to repossess,'1 but does not hold that the seller has the right to
enter the buyer's premises. In the only case found which is squarely
in point,12 nominal damages were awarded where defendant's agent
entered plaintiff's office in his home while plaintiff was away and re-
moved a machine used in his medical practice.
In cases where the retaking threatens a trespass against the person,
the vendor proceeds with the undertaking at his peril.18 Where de-
fendant's agent took a conditionally sold horse in the presence of plain-
tiff's mother and over her protests, there was no liability,14 but where
the agent was rude, harsh, and high-handed the court awarded dam-
766 (1933); Nat. Bond & Investment Co. v. Whithorn, 276 Ky. 204, 123 S. W. 2d
263 (1939); McLean v. Underdal, 73 N. D. 74, 11 N. W. 2d 102 (1943) ; Lamb
v. Woodry, 154 Ore. 30, 58 P. 2d 1257 (1936) ; Childress v. Judson Mills Store
Co., 189 S. C. 224, 200 S. E. 770 (1939). Compare R. C. A. Photophone v.
Shanum, 189 Ark. 797, 75 S.W. 2d 59 (1934) (Court held that there was no basis
for damages where defendant's agent surreptitiously entered plaintiff's motion
picture theatre and removed part of the sound equipment), with Girard v. Ander-
son, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N. W. 450 (1934) (Defendant was liable when his agent,
in plaintiff's absence, entered his unlocked house and removed his piano), and
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Hayes, 22 Ala. App. 254, 114 So. 420 (1927) (If
defendant went through an open door there was no liability, but if he broke into
the house he was guilty of trespass).
7 Dominick v. Rea, 226 Mich. 594, 198 N. W. 184 (1924) ; Wilson Motor Co.
v. Dunn, 129 Okl. 211, 264 Pac. 194 (1928) ; Soulias v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S. C.
355, 17 S. E. 2d 869 (1941) (Actual and punitive damages were awarded where
the vendor ripped the padlock and staple off plaintiff's door to repossess a com-
mercial ice cream machine) ; Childress v. Judson Mills Store Co., 189 S. C. 224,
200 S. E. 770 (1939) ; Lyda v. Cooper, 169 S. C. 451, 169, S. E. 236 (1933).
' General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hicks, 189 Ark. 62, 70 S. W. 2d 509
(1934) (Defendant's agent, in repossessing a refrigerator, broke into plaintiff's
storehouse leaving the storehouse open. In addition to being held liable for tres-
pass, defendant was assessed damages for other property subsequently removed by
thieves).
' Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 42, 257 N. W. 400 (1934) ; Sturman v. Polito,
161 Misc. 536, 291 N. Y. Supp. 621 (1936); Stewart v. F. A. North Co., 65 Pa.
Super. 195 (1916).
" Fulton Investment Co. v. Fraser, 76 Colo. 125, 230 Pac. 600 (1924) (De-
fendant was not liable for entering and taking possession of wheat held under a
chattel mortgage even though he broke the lock on the gate to plaintiff's farm in
the process).
"' Freeman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 N. C. 257, 171 S. E. 63
(1933).
2 Parris v. Fischer & Co., 221 N. C. 110, 19 S. E. 2d 128 (1942).
"I Girard v. Anderson 219 Iowa 142, 257 N. W. 400 (1934) (and cases there
cited).
",Willis v. Whittle, 82 S. C. 500, 64 S. E. 410 (1909).
[Vol. 30
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ages.15 If actual physical force is used, liability almost always results.
Thus, defendant was held liable when his agent pushed a front door
against plaintiff who was barring his entrance;16 where plaintiff was
pushed aside when she attempted to block defendant's exit;17 where
plaintiff, plaintiff's companion and defendant engaged in a "tug-of-war"
over a stove ;18 and where defendant's agent tipped a sewing machine
so that plaintiff, who was sitting on it to prevent its removal, slid to
the floor.19 Liability was also found where defendant and two police-
men pulled plaintiff's wife out of an automobile ;20 and where defendant,
in repossessing a car, pushed and pinched plaintiff to get him out of
the vehicle and then drove around at a dangerous speed in an endeavor
to get plaintiff off the running board.21  In some cases, where the con-
tract authorizes the use of force, the courts have held that the vendor
may use a reasonable and necessary force in retaking.2 2 However, most
courts refuse to recognize such contractual authority.23
North Carolina adopted a strict view in Freeman v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp.,24 where defendant was held liable for his agent's
harsh manners and raised voice. The court held: "Where there is .such
a show of force as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of
the one in possession of premises that he must yield to avoid a breach
of the peace, this is a yielding upon force and constitutes a forcible
trespass."
If the seller resorts to trick or fraud to effect repossession, the court
will generally find for the vendee. 25 The same is true where the goods
" Crews & Green v. Parker, 192 Ala. 383, 68 So. 287 (1915); Bordeaux v.
Hartman Furniture and Carpet Co., 115 Mo. App. 556, 91 S. W. 1020 (1905);
Webber v. Farmers Chevrolet Co., 186 S. C. 111, 195 S. E. 139 (1938) ; Cecil
Baber Electric Co. v. Greer, 183 Old. 541, 83 P. 2d 598 (1938) (Defendant's agent
acted in a high-handed manner, told plaintiff to "go to hell." Plaintiff left to get
a weapon with which to protect himself. The court found that the agent's acts
tended to breach the peace).
Spangler-Bowers v. Benton, 229 Mo. App. 919, 83 S. W. 2d 170 (1935).
2? Culver v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 645, 62 S. W. 922 (1901).
Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Cal. 2d 109, 130 P. 2d 389 (1942) ; Lamb v. Woodry, 154
Ore. 30, 58 P. 2d 1257 (1936).
" Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N. E. 793 (1911).
But cf. Biggs v. Seufferlein, 164 Iowa 241, 145 N. W. 507 (1914) (Defendant was
held without liability for removing plaintiff from atop a stove).
2' Roberts v. Speck, 169 Wash. 613, 14 P. 2d 33 (1932).
"
2 Dooley v. West American Commercial Insurance Co., 133 Cal. App. 58, 23
P. 2d 766 (1933).
-"Walsh v. Taylor, 39 Md. 592 (1873); Lambert v. Robinson, 162 Mass. 34
(1894).
"Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Hayes, 22 Ala. App. 250, 114 So. 420 (1927);
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Methuin, 184 Ala. 554, 63 So. 987 (1913) ; Motor
Equipment Co. v. McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258, 133 P. 2d 149 (1943) ; Frederickson
v. Singer Mfg. Co., 38 Minn. 356, 37 N. W. 453 (1888) ; Abel v. M. H. Pickering
Co., 58 Pa. Super. 439 (1914).
24205 N. C. 257, 171 S. E. 63 (1933), 47 HARv. L. Rav. 884 (1934) ; Accord,
Binder v. Acceptance Corporation, 222 N. C. 512, 23 S. E. 2d 894 (1943).
25 Burhain v. Standridge, 201 Ark. 1143, 148 S. W. 2d 648 (1941) ; W. Cleve
Stokes Co. v. Rushton, 238 Ala. 458, 191 So. 614 (1939) ; McCarty-Greene Motor
1952]
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are returned to the vendor for repairs and he repossesses them.2 0 How-
ever, if the vendor's claim to possession is based solely on a repair lien,
he is entitled to retain the chattel until the lien is satisfied.27 Where the
repossession is accomplished under color of legal authority, the taking
is regarded as coercive and intimidating, amounting to force,28 although
in one instance it was held that the fraud did no more than make plain-
tiff do what he ought to do.29 If the vendor resorts to legal process
which is subsequently declared void, he may still act on his own behalf.8 °
Cases sometime arise involving trespass against the property sought
to be repossessed. Contracts for the conditional sale of automobiles often
provide that the seller may repossess the automobile wherever found.
Under such a contract if the vendor finds the car parked on the streets
unattended and takes it into his possession he will not be held liable.8 1
In an Oregon case, 32 plaintiff and defendant's agent got into a scuffle
over an automobile repossessed by defendant's agent after the agent had
gotten into the car and had taken possession. The court held for de-
fendant finding that the repossession was peaceful and that plaintiff
breached the peace in an effort to retake the car wrongfully. The only
case found in which the seller was held liable under such circumstances
based liability upon damage done to the car when defendant's agent
broke the window to obtain entrance.88 Even in the absence of a con-
tractual provision that the car may be repossessed wherever found,
North Carolina has not found liability where the vendor repossessed the
car when found parked on the street.34
Co. v. House, 216 Ala. 666, 114 So. 60 (1927). Contra: North v. Williams, 120
Pa. 109, 13 Atl. 723 (1888) (Defendant's agent obtained entrance to plaintiff's
house by telling her that they had come to tune her piano. Instead of tuning, he
removed and repossessed the instrument).
" Walker v. Ayers, 47 Ga. App. 113, 169 S. E. 784 (1933) ; Kaufman v. Simons
Motor Sales, Inc., 236 App. Div. 98, 258 N. Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dep't 1932) ; Mur-
ray v. Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp., 160 Tenn. 140, 22 S. W. 2d 227 (1929).2 7 N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-2 (1951).
28McClure v. Hill, 36 Ark. 268 (1881); See v. Automobile Discount Corp.,
330 Mo. 906, 50 S. W. 2d 993 (1932) ; Firebaugh v. Gunther, 106 Okl. 131, 233
Pac. 460 (1925).
"
9 Day v. Nat. Bond & Investment Co., 99 S. W. 2d 117 (Mo. 1936).
" Ellis v. Smathers, 206 Ark. 247, 174 S. W. 2d 568 (1943) ; Hartford Accept-
ance Corp. v. Kirchheimer, 166 Misc. 219, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 224 (N. Y. Munic. Ct.
1938) ; Grossman v. Weiss, 129 Misc. Rep. 234, 221 N. Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct.
1927) ; Mendelson v. Irving, 155 App. Div. 114, 139 N. Y. Supp. 1065 (1st Dep't
1913); Kismer v. Commercial Credit Co., 114 W. Va. 811, 174 S. E. 330 (1934).
"1Lange v. Midwest Motor Securities, 231 S. W. 272 (Mo. 1921) ; Morris v.
Commercial Credit Co., 55 Ohio App. 391, 9 N. E. 2d 880 (1937) ; Lepley v. State
69 Okl. Cr. 379, 103 P. 2d 568 (1940) ; First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Winter,
176 OkI. 400, 55 P. 2d 1029 (1936) ; Leedy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
173 Okl. 445, 48 P. 2d 1074 (1935).2 Westerman v. Oregon Credit Corp., 168 Ore. 216, 122 P. 2d 435 (1942).
2 Commercial Credit Co. v. Spence, 185 Miss. 293, 184 So. 439 (1938).
24 State v. Stinnett, 203 N. C. 829, 167 S. E. 63 (1932); accord, Jackson v.




Where a chattel not covered by the conditional sales contract is re-
possessed along with an automobile, the North Carolina court has found
liability.3 5 And, in South Carolina where the contract authorized the
taking of any property in the automobile the court held that that privilege
only applied to property not visible and found liability for property that
could have been seen.36
The principal case in denying liability in spite of the technical tres-
pass on plaintiff's premises is clearly in accord with the general rule.
However, if the same facts arose in North Carolina, the court would
probably grant at least nominal damages since a repossessing seller has
no right to enter the buyer's premises.37
JAMES R. TROTTER.
Constitutional Law-'"Separate but Equal" Test
in Graduate Education
In McKissick v. Carmichael1 the court decided that the separate law
school furnished Negroes by the State of North Carolina was not sub-
stantially equal, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment, to the law
school furnished white students at the University of North Carolina.
The University law school was ordered to admit qualified Negro appli-
cants. The decision followed by less than a year Sweatt v. Painter2 and
applied the principles first enunciated in that case to a situation ap-
proaching much nearer equality between the white and Negro schools.
The constitutions and statutes of the southern states require the
segregation of the white and colored races in the public educational
system.3 Educational segregation affording equal facilities has been
authorized by the federal courts as a proper exercise of state police
power since Plessy v. Ferguson4 in 1896, a case actually involving segre-
gation in interstate carriers. Segregation in public education was spe-
cifically held to be constitutional in the later case of Gong Lum v. Rice.5
While segregation per se does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
" Narron v. Chevrolet Co., 205 N. C. 307, 171 S. E. 93 (1933) (Personal be-
longings left in the glove compartment and on the back seat).
"o Sanders v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 180 S. C. 38, 185 S. E. 180(1936).
"' Parrisv. Fischer & Co., 221 N. C. 110, 19 S. E. 2d 128 (1942).
187 F. 2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 951 (1951).
2339 U. S. 629 (1950).
"The children of the white race and the colored race shall be taught in sepa-
rate schools, but there shall be no discrimination in favor of, or to the prejudice
of, either race." N. C. Constitution, Art. IX, §2; N. C. GEN. STAT. §115-3 (1943).
For provisions in other states see MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO, 79
et seq. (1940).
'163 U. S. 537 (1896).
275 U. S. 78 (1927). The state may impose segregation in private schools.
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908).
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the equal protection clause requires that the separate facilities furnished
must be equal. 6
For many years the federal courts ruled that this "separate but
equal" rule was satisfied by "substantial" equality.7 But with increasing
litigation in the field of segregation in education since the 1930's, the
federal courts have moved toward a stricter requirement of real equality
in fact. In Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada8 it was held that the
practice of sending Negro college students out of state for courses not
available within the state was a denial of equal protection: the required
equal facilities must be furnished within the state. Then, in Sipuel v.
Board of Regents9 it was emphasized that the right to equal facilities is
personal and present: the facilities must be furnished regardless of the
number of applicants and "as soon as for any other group." Johnson
v. Board of Trustees 0 held that provision for a white faculty to com-
mute to classes at a Negro college did not afford Negro students equal
protection. Further cases brought into question equality in the lower
public schools..'
In 1950, Sweatt v. Painter threw an entirely new light on the appli-
cation of the "separate but equal" rule in the field of higher education.
The filing of a suit to gain admission for Negroes to the University of
Texas law school had prompted Texas to establish, for the first time, a
Negro law school. The Supreme Court, in examining the physical
facilities of the two schools, found the Negro school unequal to the white
school. But more important, the Court compared the "intangible fac-
tors" of reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration,
position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, and
traditions and prestige of the two schools. The Court stated that a
legal education '"cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals
and institutions with which the law interacts. The law school to which
'Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 (1927); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry., 235 U. S. 151 (1914) ; McMillan v. School District, 107 N. C. 609, 12 S. E.
330 (1890). See cases collected in Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 521, 531 (E. D.
S. C. 1951).
"For example in United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730 (C. C., Ohio, 1882),
there was held to be no denial of equal protection to Negroes within a school dis-
trict though no Negro school was provided within the district and Negroes had
to go 5 miles to a school outside the district. In Cummings v. Board of Educa-
tion, 175 U. S. 528 (1899), discontinuance of a Negro high school in order to
maintain lower Negro schools was allowed "in the interest of the greater number
of colored children," though a white high school continued to be maintained. The
Court used the language that "Any interference on the part of the Federal author-
ity with the management of state schools cannot be justified except in the case
of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of
the land." Cummings v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528, 545 (1899).
'305 U. S. 337 (1938) ; Note, 17 N. C. L. REv. 280 (1939).
9332 U. S. 631 (1948).
" Johnson v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Kentucky, 83 F. Supp. 707 (E. D.
Ky. 1949).
'See p. 158, infra, on public schools.
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Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from its student body mem-
bers of the racial groups which number 85 per cent of the population
of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges,
and other officials. . . With such a significant segment of society
excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner is
substantially equal.' 12
Against this background the case of McKissick v. Carmichael's
arose to test the equality of the separate legal education given by the
State of North Carolina. The fact that the law school for Negroes was
not at the time of the suit a hastily set-up school, but one which had
been in operation for ten years with a student body of twenty-eight, a
faculty of seven, and an annual budget of $52,00014 differentiated the
case from Sweatt v. Painter.
The Court of Appeals found that the case "differed in circumstance
but not in principle" from Sweatt v. Painter. The court said there were
inequalities in those facilities capable of objective measurement-build-
ing,' 5 libraries, 16 the number of subjects offered, 17 activities such as
law review work,' 8 and the existence of a summer school at the white
law school. The size of classes at the Negro law school was found to
permit more personal instruction than at the white school but to be too
small for full discussion.19
Turning to a consideration of the intangible qualities of the two
schools, the court found that the faculty of the white law school was
superior in teaching experience, scholarly research, reputation, and in
work with legislative bodies. With fewer courses to teach, there was
" Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 634 (1950). In McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950), decided at the same time as Sweatt v. Painter,
the Court held that the action of the University of Oklahoma in setting apart a
Negro graduate student, once admitted, in the classroom, dining hall, and library,
was a denial of equal protection. The Court will not allow embarrassing restric-
tions to be placed on the use of educational facilities after admission. The Negro
student must be free "to study, engage in discussion, to secure acceptance by his
fellow students on his own merits, and, in general, to learn his profession"' Does
this holding apply only to facilities immediately necessary for study, or to any
services furnished by the school? For example, see Time, Oct. 8, 1951, p. 85,
col. 1, and Oct. 22, 1951, p. 92, col. 3, on the problem of student admission to foot-
ball games.
13187 F. 2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 951 (1951), reversing 93 F.
Supp. 327 (M. D. N. C. 1950).4 73 SCHOOL AND SocETY 326 (1951).
"' The white law school building was described as "superior," and at the time
was in the process of enlargement. The Negro school was being moved to a
remodeled building described as "ample."
" The white law library had 64,000 volumes; the Negro law library bad
30,000.
x The white law school listed 40 courses; the Negro school, 27 courses.
18 The white law school has a law review which has been published since 1922
and a Chapter of the Order of the Coif; the Negro law school has neither.
1" Classes at the white school were as large as 80 to 100; those at the Negro
school were 8 or 9. Expert opinion gave the ideal number as 25 students.
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a greater opportunity for specialization. 20 The absence of white stu-
dents at the Negro school was said to deprive the Negro students of the
benefit of a full range of discussion and of an opportunity "to form ac-
quaintances with the persons who will later occupy positions of influence
in the profession." "It is a definite handicap to the colored student to
confine his association in the law school to people of his own class." 21
The court concluded that the circumstances at the Negro school of
greater personal attention and association with the race from which
future clients of the Negro students would come, which the District
Court had balanced in finding equality, "do not overcome the deficiencies
disclosed." 2 2
The grounds upon which the Sweatt and McKissick cases are 'de-
cided seem to lead to the conclusion that it is not possible for a state
to establish a separate law school for Negroes which will be found to
afford equal facilities. To attain equality in faculty reputation, adminis-
trative experience, alumni, and prestige of the school would appear to
be almost impossible for a recently established school (which most of
the separate graduate schools are) 23 Beyond these factors lies the re-
quirement of the opportunity to associate and exchange ideas with the
white segment of the population. In the Sweatt case the court stated
that with white students excluded legal education "cannot be effective"
and "we cannot conclude" [italics added] it to be equal. 24 By the use
of these phrases the court seems to be saying that segregation is per se
unconstitutional in legal education. 25
To what extent will other graduate schools be affected? By analogy,
the "intangible factors" of faculty reputation, administrative experience,
"0 "Most of the witnesses did not venture the opinion that the faculties were of
equal quality." "The University Law School, its faculty and its Law Review enjoy
a fine reputation in legal circles." McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F. 2d 949, 951(4th Cir. 1951). The District Court had found "ample testimony that the [Negro]
faculty is capable and . . .keeps pace with that at the [white] University." Epps
v. Carmichael, 93 F. Supp. 327, 330 (M.D. N. C. 1950). The District Court did
not discuss as such the reputation of the faculty nor the reputation of the school,
which the Sweatt case had listed as material factors.
"McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F. 2d 949, 952 (4th Cir. 1951). The District
Court had recognized that 74% of the population of the state is white; but said
there was no evidence to show that any Negro lawyer ever represented a white
client, and that therefore advantages of contacts with members of their own race
would exceed any advantages of going to the white University. Neither decision
makes direct reference to the alumni of the two schools, another factor which the
Sweatt case held material.
-" McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F. 2d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1951).
-, For example, all five of the state-supported Negro law schools in the South
were established since 1939: Lincoln University, Missouri, 1939; North Carolina
College, ,1939; Texas State University, 1947; Southern University (Louisiana),
1947; and South Carolina State College, 1947. 73 ScHooL AND SocinTy, 326
(1951).
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629, 634 (1950).
22 See Roche, Education, Segregation, and the Supreme Court, 99 U. or PA.
L. REv. 949 (1951); Note, 39 Ky. L. J. 492 (1951); Note, 36 VA. L. REv. 797(1950).
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and standing of the school would probably be held to be material. As a
practical matter, this would often determine the question. But would
association with white students necessarily be a factor in other graduate
education? In fields concerned with some degree of social work, such
as education, sociology, and possibly medicine, opportunity to associate
with the white population would probably be found to be a necessary
part of the education. In other fields more removed from the "human"
element, such as most scientific, engineering, and technical studies, there
would seem to be less basis for emphasizing this factor of association.
At any rate, the high cost of segregation itself26 and the uncertainty of
success in attempting to provide separate graduate schools for a small
number of students2 7 has brought about admission of Negroes into
graduate schools of white universites, where not otherwise provided,
in all but five southern states.28 While the new project of regional
"' For example, the average annual expenditure in 1949-1950 by the state for
each white student in the University of North Carolina Law School was $416; for
each Negro student in the North Carolina College school it was $1460. McKissick
v. Carmichael, 187 F. 2d 949, 953 (1951). In other Southern state-supported Negro
law schools, operational expenses in 1949-50 for each Negro student were: Lincoln
University (Mo.), $1,728; Texas State University, $2,390; Southern University
(La.), $1,990; and South Carolina State, $2,775. 73 SCHOOL AND SocIETY 326
(1951). From 1941 to 1943, Missouri spent $229 per student for 17,010 whites at
the University of Missouri and $697 per student for 1,228 Negroes at Lincoln
University. FRAzIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 487 (1949).
2? Cases testing the equality of separate graduate education actually provided,
as distinguished from a failure to provide any facilities at all, have all found the
separate facilities unequal. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950); Missouri
ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938); McKissick v. Carmichael, 187
F. 2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951) ; Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of L. S. U., 92 F. Supp.
986 (E. D. La. 1950); Johnson v. Board of Trustees of U. of Ky., 83 F. Supp.
707 (E. D. Ky. 1949); McReady v. Byrd, 73 A. 2d 8 (Md. 1950); Pearson v.
Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936).
28 For the school year 1950-51 the estimate is that 300 Negroes attended state-
supported Southern white colleges. Including private schools and summer sessions,
the figure comes to about 2,000. The Crisis, June, 1951, p. 400. Some of the
figures for individual schools are: University of Oklahoma, 60; University of
Kentucky, 85; University of Louisville, 20; University of Arkansas, 15; University
of Texas, 19; University of Missouri, 15; University of Delaware, 3; University
of West Virginia, 75; University of Virginia, 1; Louisiana State, 1; Union Theo-
logical Seminary, 22; and Berea College, 3. The Crisis, August, 1951, p. 458;
The Southern Patriot, Nov. 1950, p. 2. Baptist schools of theology, and Catholic
colleges in the South are now accepting Negroes. The New Leader, Sept. 3, 1951,
p. 2. On April 4, 1951, the Board of Trustees at the University of North Carolina
passed a resolution providing for the admission of Negroes into graduate schools
at the University when such schools are not otherwise provided in the state.
Raleigh News and Observer, April 5, 1951, p. 1, col. 6. As a result of this reso-
lution, there is at present one Negro attending the Medical School at the Univer-
sity, in addition to five in the Law School. On March 9, 1950, Kentucky repealed
segregation laws so far as they applied to institutions of higher education, both
graduate and undergraduate, private and public. Konnite, Extent and Character of
Segregation, 20 JOURNAL OF NEGRO EDUCATIoN 425 (1951). Among the five states
not admitting Negroes-Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Caro-
lina-action is pending against the University of Georgia Law School, Southern
Patriot, Sept., 1951, p. 1. A Florida decision allowing admission of Negroes on a
temporary basis while other separate facilities are provided has been appealed to
the Supreme Court. State v. Board of Control, 47 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1951) ; peti-
tion for cert. filed, 20 Law Week 3112 (1951).
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graduate schools in the South 29 points to an improvement in graduate
education, it does not seem to be a solution to the desire in the South
for segregation. The Gaines case requires that equal education be fur-
nished within the state. Consequently, a recent Maryland case30 holds
that the offer of graduate education at a regional school outside the
state does not meet the equal protection standard.
In undergraduate education, the intangible qualities of faculty, ad-
ministration, and school standing would probably be held material;
though perhaps there would be no definitely ascertainable need for
professional contacts. Nor, in most courses, would the opportunity to
exchange ideas with white students be so essential as in graduate fields
such as law. So far, undergraduate education has come in for little
litigation.3 1
Decisions determining the equality of segregated public lower schools
have so far not been based on "intangible factors."'3 2 Recent compari-
sons in high schools have been based on physical plant, location of the
school with regard to the students, transportation facilities, recreational
facilities, range of courses, teacher salaries, extracurricular activities,
and, in one case, the quality of instruction. 3 Comparisons in graded
"The regional plan was set forth in a compact by the governors of eight
Southern states with the purpose of providing regional graduate schools, with en-
rollment allowed students from any state in the compact. N. Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1948, p. 15, col. 1. The plan envisaged the use of four institutions for veterinary
medicine, seven for medicine, and six for dentistry. In 1949-50, education under
the plan was given 231 Negroes and 233 whites, and expenditures were $1,736,000.
Survey, Sept., 1949, p. 476. See Note, 1 VAND. L. Rav. 403 (1948) for the com-
pact of the Southern states and a discussion of its relationship to the equal pro-
tection clause.
"0 McReady v. Byrd, 73 A. 2d 8 (Md. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 827 (1950).
Maryland offered a nursing course at Meharry Medical College in Tennessee, under
the regional school project, at a cost, including traveling and living expenses,
equal to that in Maryland.
" A recent Deleware case which decided that the state Negro undergraduate
college was not the equal of the white university relied chiefly upon a comparison
of the physical plant, the range of courses available, and the faculty salary scales.
Mentioned but not emphasized were the quality of the two administrations and the
lack of distinctions and publications on the part of the Negro faculty. Parker v.
Univ. of Delaware, 75 A. 2d 230 (Del. Ch. 1950).
2 Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E. D. S. C. 1951), suggests the problem is
different at lower school levels for three reasons. First, there is no problem of
professional contacts. Second, at the graduate level, mature and less excitable
persons are being dealt with. Third, children are taken from parents by compul-
sion, and therefore more consideration must be given to the wishes of the parent.3 Carter v. School Board of Arlington County, Va., 182 F. 2d 531 (4th Cir.
1950) (physical plant, range of courses, extracurricular activities) ; Brown v.
Ramsey, 185 F. 2d 225 (8th Cir. 1950) (teacher salaries, quality of instruction) ;
Corbin v. County School Board of Pulaski County, 177 F. 2d 924 (4th Cir. 1949)(physical plant, location of school, transportation facilities, range of courses, extra
curricular activities) ; Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797(D. Kan. 1951) (physical plant, location of school, range of courses); Blue v.
Durham Public School District, 95 F. Supp. 441 (M. D. N. C. 1951) (physical
plant, recreational facilities, extra curricular activities); State v. Board of Edu-
cation, 233 S. W. 2d 698 (Mo. 1950) (range of courses5.
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schools have been principally based on physical facilities34 and teacher
salaries and training.35
Some quarters have long contended that any segregation at all in
education is unconstitutional.3 6 Basically, this contention takes the form
that the authority supporting segregation in education is based on dicta
in Plessy v. Ferguson and should not be controlling; and that as
psychology shows harmful effects to result upon segregated children, any
segregation at all is discrimination. In Briggs v. Elliot,3 a case arising
from South Carolina, this issue was squarely raised. The majority of
the special three-judge federal court recognizes the statements on edu-
cation in Plessy v. Ferguson as dicta, but declares that "directly in point
and absolutely controlling upon us so long as it stands unreversed by
the Supreme Court is Gong Lure v. Rice [which] cannot be distin-
guished." 38  The court quotes from the Gong Lur decision :39 "The
question [of segregation] has been many times decided to be within the
constitutional power of the state legislature to settle. The decision is
within the discretion of the state in regulating its public schools, and
does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment." Final decision in
the Briggs case,4 0 plus future litigation, will disclose whether the Su-
preme Court is to maintain the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field
of education, abandon it completely, or continue to cut away at its sub-
stance by further limitations as in Sweatt v. Painter.
DIcIsoN McLEAN, JR.
Carr v. Coming, 182 F. 2d 14 (D. C. Cir. 1950) ; Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. C. Kan. 1951); Freeman v. County School
Board, 82 F. Supp. 167 (E. D. Va. 1948).
" Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951);
Freeman v. County School Board, 82 F. Supp. 167 (E. D. Va. 1948).
" See anicus curiae brief for the Committee of Law Teachers against Segre-
gation in Legal Education, filed in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), re-
printed in 34 MINN. L. REv. 289 (1950) ; Waite, The Negro in the Supreme Court,
30 MiNN. L. REv. 219 (1946) ; Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1059 (1947). Plessy v. Fergu-
son itself contained a vigorous dissent by Justice Harlan on the grounds that the
purpose and intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to invalidate segregation
laws and that classification by race was unreasonable. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U. S. 537, 552 (1896); Note, 49 COL. L. Rxv. 629 (1949). These views were
reiterated in a dissenting opinion in Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529, 538 (E. D.
S. C. 1951) by Waring, J.
" 98 F. Supp. 529 (E. D. S. C. 1951).
"Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529, 532 (E. D. S. C. 1951). "A decision which
the Supreme court has not seen fit to overrule and which it expressly refrained
from re-examining, although urged to do so in the very recent case of Sweatt
v. Painter, may not be disregarded." Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F. 2d 582 (4th Cir.
9 ong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 87 (1927).
The Supreme Court on appeal has ordered that the case be remanded to the
District Court for further action upon the progress report which had been required
of the school officials. The Court said it would like to have the "benefit of the
views of the District Court" on the report before making final decision. Raleigh
News and Observer, Jan. 29, 1952, p. 1, col. 4. Appeal has also been filed to test
the constitutionality of the Kansas educational segregation statute involved in
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), 20
Law Week 3136 (1951).
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Deeds-Priority of Description-Practical Location
In the recent North Carolina case of Brown v. Hodges,1 plaintiff
and defendant were adjoining landowners, deriving their respective
titles from a common source. A dispute arose as to the boundary line
between them.2 The pertinent call in the deed under which defendant
claims was, "thence . . . west with the highway 50 poles to a stake at
the highway." The pertinent call in plaintiff's deed was the reverse of
this call, but identical with it. Plaintiff alleged that the true line ran
with the original survey of the highway, and not with the highway as it
existed at the time of the execution of the deeds, and as it now exists.
He was permitted to show by parol evidence, over defendant's objection,
that a surveyor for plaintiff's predecessors in title had found "stakes for
a road" along the line as contended for by plaintiff. There was no evi-
dence that this surveyor marked the line or marked a corner at the end
of the line as run by him. No road was ever constructed on the site of
the original survey.
At trial defendant requested peremptory instruction in his favor;
the request was denied, and verdict was rendered for plaintiff. On
appeal the court held that the trial court erred in admitting parol testi-
mony tending to vary the calls in the deeds, and granted a new trial.
The volume of litigation involving questions relative to boundaries
of land has resulted in some well established principles as to priority of
descriptions in 'deeds.
Practical location by the parties3 When it can be proved that the
parties grantor and grantee went upon the land and made a physical
survey thereof, giving it a boundary that was actually run and marked,
and a corner made,4 the party claiming under the deed shall hold ac-
cordingly, notwithstanding a variant -description on the face of the in-
strument. 5 The act of practical location, however, does not, ipso facto,
admit parol testimony. It must be shown that the boundary monuments
were erected prior to, or contemporaneously with, the execution of the
deed, before such evidence is admissible. 6 A definite minority of juris-
1232 N. C. 537, 61 S. E. 2d 603 (1950), rehearing denied, 233 N. C. 617, 65 S. E.
2d 144 (1951). The case was heard on a prior occasion and reported in 230 N. C.
746, 55 S. E. 2d 498 (1949).
Title to the respective tracts was not in dispute.
' "Practical location" as here treated involves grantor and grantee. For dis-
cussion of "practical location," i.e., settlement of boundary dispute between ad-joining land owners by location and acquiescence, see Comment, 21 YALE L. J. 509
(1912).
'Brown v. Hodges, 233 N. C. 617, 65 S. E. 2d 144 (1951) (Giving to a line a
permanent location and to a corner a permanent position).
The practical location rule in North Carolina is treated as an exception to
the general rule that monuments mentioned in a deed are to be accorded first pref-
erence. Yopp v. Aman, 212 N. C. 479, 193 S. E. 822 (1937) ; Dudley v. Jeffress,
178 N. C. 111, 100 S. E. 253 (1919); Clarke v. Aldridge, 162 N. C. 326, 78 S. E.
216 (1913) ; Cherry v. Slade, 7 N. C. 82 (1819).
Yopp v. Aman, 212 N. C. 479, 193 S. E. 822 (1937); Watford v. Pierce, 188
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dictions give effect to monuments designated after execution of the
deed.7
It is a patent violation of the parol evidence rule to allow oral testi-
mony of practical location to contradict and control the written descrip-
tion in a deed. The North Carolina court has recognized it as such,
and has on occasion lamented the fact as leading to fraud and to inse-
curity of titles ;8 its application continues, nevertheless.
Monuments. Calls in a deed for monuments, natural9 or artificial,' 0
control calls for course and distance, and the lines terminate at the
former, regardless of the distance specified." The rationale for this is
that for any number of reasons course and 'distance may be incorrect,
but monuments, being objects of immutability, are more likely to con-
form to grantor's intention. A stake has never been accorded the dig-
nity of a monument in North Carolina, and consequently, for purposes
of practical location, has never been the basis for varying the construc-
tion of a written deed.12 Justice Hall, concurring in Reed v. Shenck,13
speaking of stakes, said, "they bespeak more of locality, to be sure, than
floating feathers on the water, but they are as unfit to be boundaries of
N. C. 430, 124 S. E. 838 (1924); Ritter Lumber Co. v. Montvale Lumber Co.,
169 N. C. 80, 85 S. E. 438 (1915) ; Clarke v. Aldridge, 162 N. C. 326, 78 S. E. 216(1913) ; Higdon v. Rice, 119 N. C. 623, 26 S. E. 256 (1896) ; Reed v. Shenck,
13 N. C. 415 (1830); Bradford v. Hill, 2 N. C. 22 (1793).
Bemis v. Bradley, 126 Me. 462, 139 At. 593 (1927) ; In Manchester v. Hodge,
74 N. H. 468, 69 Atl. 527 (1908), the court followed the minority view, but inti-
mated it believed the monument had been erected prior to the execution of the
deed.
8 "But it must be confessed, however much to be lamented, that our courts have
permitted parol evidence to contradict a deed. . . ." Slade v. Green, 9 N. C. 218,
224 (1822); Potter v. Bonner, 174 N. C. 20, 93 S. E. 370 (1917); Allison v.
Kenion, 163 N. C. 582, 79 S. E. 1110 (1913).
'The following, but not by way of limitation, have been held to be natural
monuments: Byrd v. Spruce Co., 170 N. C. 429, 87 S. E. 241 (1915) (creek);
Lumber Co. v. Bernhardt, 162 N. C. 460, 78 S. E. 485 (1913) (established line of
adjacent tract) ; Plemmons v. Cutshell, 234 N. C. 506, - S. E. 2d - (1951)
(same) ; Sherrod v. Battle, 154 N. C. 345, 70 S. E. 834 (1911) (ditch, drain and
water course) ; McNeely v. Laxton, 149 N. C. 327, 63 S. E. 278 (1908) (tree) ;
Clark v. Moore, 126 N. C. 1, 35 S. E. 125 (1900) (fort entrenchment and marl
pit); Clarke v. Wagner, 76 N. C. 463 (1877) (island); Literary Fund v. Clark,
31 N. C. 58 (1848) (lake and mountains); Hough v. Home, 20 N. C. 369 (1839)(highway); Reed v. Shenck, 13 N. C. 415 (1830) (rocks); Pollock v. Harris, 2
N. C. 252 (1796) (marsh, pocosin and swamp) ; Sandifer v. Foster, 2 N. C. 237(1795) (river).
" Reed v. Shenck, 14 N. C. 65 (1831) (Some permanent monument, which will
endure for years, placed by the hand of man).
" Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S. E. 2d 257 (1945) ; Nelson v. Lineker,
172 N. C. 279, 90 S. E. 251 (1916) ; Cherry v. Slade, 7 N. C. 82 (1819) ; accord,
Schultz v. Maxey, 307 Ky. 325, 210 S. W. 2d 950 (1948) ; TrFFANY, THaE MODERN
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §673 (1940). But cf. White v. Luning, 93 U. S. 514(1876), for "absurdity theory," holding that monuments may yield to course and
distance if to follow the former would defeat the conveyance, whereby adherence
to the latter would effectuate all other parts of the description.
" Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S. E. 2d 257 (1945) ; Tate v. Johnson,
148 N. C. 267, 61 S. E. 741 (1908); Clark v. Moore, 126 N. C. 1, 35 S. E. 125(1900); Reed v. Shenck, 14 N. C. 65 (1831).
1 14 N. C. 65, 75 (1831).
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land." A few states, however, with regard to the sufficiency of a stake
for such purposes, have held otherwise.' 4
Course and distance. Where there has been no practical location
by the parties to the instrument, or no monuments are called for in the
deed nor can be ascertained by evidence, then course and distance will
prevail over less certain descriptive elements.' 5  Between the two, course
is given priority.1'
Area. The courts are almost unanimous in holding that area or
quantity as an element of description could be significant, but they like-
wise infer that the possibility is a remote one since area or contents
called for is usually only an approximation. 17 Consequently, for all prac-
tical purposes, area is virtually disregarded.
In the principal case, then, it is readily apparent that the North
Carolina court reached a decision in accord, not only with prior rulings
in this jurisdiction, but with the decided weight of authority. Plaintiff's
argument, based on the application of the practical location rule, failed
when the court declared that stakes were not such monuments as to
satisfy the requisites of practical location, and therefore oral evidence
as to their erection was inadmissible. Defendant's contention, on the
other hand, that the highway as it existed at the time the deeds were
executed was the true boundary, found support in the fact that the
highway, i.e., monument, was called for in the deeds. No call for the
"survey of the highway," as contended for by plaintiff, was mentioned.
In light of the fact that application of the practical location doc-
trine violates the parol evidence rule, it is well that the North Carolina
Supreme Court did not permit further laxity in its scope.
HAL W. BROADrOOT.
Evidence-Automobiles--Identification of Driver
In ruling on a motion for judgment of non suit in a criminal case,1
1, Winbourne v. Russell, 50 So. 2d 721 (Ala. 1951) (iron stakes recognized by
the parties for 20 years); Arnold v. Hanson, 91 Cal. App. 2d 15, 204 P. 2d 97
(1949) (wood stakes driven by surveyor replaced with iron ones by subdivider);
Dean v. Thompson, 213 S. W. 2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
1 Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S. E. 2d 257 (1945) ; Cherry v. Slade,
7 N. C. 82 (1819) ; accord, Wagers v. Wagers, 238 S. W. 2d 125 (Ky. 1951);
TiFFANY, op. cit. supra note 11, §673.
1" Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S. E. 2d 257 (1945) ; accord, Forest
Preserve District v. Lehmann Estate, 388 Ill. 416, 58 N. E. 2d 538 (1944). See
TFANY, op. cit. smpra note 11, §673, where it is stated that between course and
distance there is no preference, citing Hall v. Eaton, 139 Mass. 217, 29 N. E. 660(1885).
" Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S. E. 2d 257 (1945) ; accord, Hollars
v. Stephenson, 99 N. E. 2d 258 (Ind. 1951); Askins v. Oil Producing Co., 201
Okla. 209, 203 P. 2d 877 (1949) ; Parrow v. Proulx, 111 Vt. 274, 15 A. 2d 835
(1940) ; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 11, §673.
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §15-173 (Supp. 1951) provides for criminal law non suit
and serves the same purpose in criminal prosecutions as is accomplished by N. C.
GEN. STAT. §1-183 (Supp. 1951) in civil actions. State v. Ormond, 211 N. C. 437,
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the court considers only incriminating evidence2 and the state is en-
titled to the most favorable interpretation of the circumstances and of
all inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom.3 The court does not
pass upon weight or credibility,4 but merely determines if there is "more
than a scintilla of evidence" to sustain the allegations of the bill of indict-
ment.5 Evidence which raises a mere conjecture or suspicion of guilt,
or a mere possibility of the existence of an essential element of the
offense is not sufficient to be submitted to the jury.6
In a recent prosecution for reckless drivingr the officers identified
a speeding automobile as belonging to the defendant,8 but were unable
to overtake it, or to identify the driver. Later the defendant stated that
he was the only driver of his car on the night in question, but at the
same time denied having been at the place in question. On this evidence,
defendant's motion for non suit was denied. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to
identify defendant as the driver of the vehicle.
Identification of defendant's vehicle is often used to corroborate
physical identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime.9
191 S. E. 22 (1937) ; State v. Fulcher, 184 N. C. 663, 113 S. E. 769 (1922). See
,Note, 23 N. C. L. REv. 223 (1945).
' State v. Moses, 207 N. C. 139, 176 S. E. 276 (1934); State v. Martin, 182
N. C. 846, 109 S. E. 74 (1921). The rule is often expressed that the court is not
confined to evidence offered by the State but can consider all the evidence before
the court. State v. Norton, 222 N. C. 418, 23 S. E. 2d 301 (1942); State v.
Killian, 173 N. C. 792, 92 S. E. 499 (1917).
a State v. Hendrick, 232 N. C. 447, 61 S. E. 2d 349 (1950) ; State v. Mann, 219
N. C. 213, 13 S. E. 2d 541 (1941) ; State v. Rountree, 181 N. C. 535, 106 S. E.
669 (1921).
' State v. Hammond, 216 N. C. 67, 3 S. E. 2d 439 (1939); State v. Cooke,
176 N. C. 731, 97 S. E. 171 (1918). Deciding the weight and credibility of the
evidence is the province of the jury, and when reasonable inferences may be drawn
from the circumstances in evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt, it is a matter
for the jury to decide whether the facts taken singly or in combination produce
in their minds the requisite moral conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Ewing, 227 N. C. 535, 42 S. E. 2d 676 (1947); State v. Lawrence, 196 N. C. 562,
146 S. E. 335 (1929) (excellent summary of the North Carolina law of nonsuit).
' State v.. Weinstein, 224 N. C. 645, 31 S. E. 2d 920 (1944) ; State v. Shermer,
216 N. C. 719, 6 S. E. 2d 529 (1940) ; State v. Landin, 209 N. C. 20, 182 S. E.
689 (1935).
o State v. Webb, 233 N. C. 382, 64 S. E. 2d 268 (1951) ; State v. Prince, 182
N. C. 788, 108 S. E. 330 (1921) ; State v. Vinson, 63 N. C. 335 (1869).
State v. Lloyd, 233 N. C. 227, 63 S. E. 2d 151 (1951).
8 Identification was based upon color and equipment; spotlights, mirror, vene-
tian blinds on back window, and tires.
o State v. Bovender, 233 N. C. 683, 65 S. E. 2d 323 (1951) (microscopic and
spectrographic examination of paint particles from defendant's vehicle as circum-
stantial evidence) ; State v. Merritt, 231 N. C. 59, 55 S. E. 2d 804 (1949) (identity
of defendant's abandoned vehicle used to corroborate physical identification) ; State
v. Fogleman, 204 N. C. 401, 168 S. E. 536 (1933) (defendant's automobile re-
sembled car stopped at deceased's store on the evening of the homicide) ; State v.
Leonard, 195 N. C. 242, 141 S. E. 736 (1928) (automobile like one involved in
collision passed witness at high speed; circumstantial evidence of identity in man-
slaughter case). Cf. State v. Cain, 175 N. C. 825, 95 S. E. 930 (1918) (presence
of man on a mule similar to one owned by defendant used to substantiate physical
identification).
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But identification of the defendant's automobile by license plate or by
physical appearance alone is not sufficient in North Carolina to identify
the owner of the vehicle as the driver at the time the offense was com-
mitted.10 Some states, by statute, have made identification of the li-
cense plate prima facie evidence in certain types of criminal cases that
the owner of the vehicle is the driver. However provisions are made
for rebutting this presumption."1 North Carolina has a similar statute,
but its application is limited to restricted types of civil suits and has no
application in criminal actions. 12
Where defendant's vehicle is identified by license or by physical
appearance at the scene of the offense, and shortly thereafter the car
is found nearby and the defendant is found near the car,18 or is seen
leaving the car,14 this is sufficient to identify the defendant as the driver
of the vehicle at the place in question. This is true even though there
was no personal identification of the defendant at the scene of the of-
fense. Also where defendant's vehicle is identified at the scene and his
footprints are found there,15 or where the defendant is seen driving
10 Although such evidence would be sufficient to establish that the crime was
committed by whoever was in defendant's vehicle, there is nothing to link de-
fendant to the automobile at the time and place of the offense. State v. Simms,
208 N. C. 459, 181 S. E. 269 (1935), And it is fundamental that in a criminal
case the state must prove, not only that the crime was committed, but also that
it was done by the person or persons charged. State v. Norggins, 215 N. C. 220,
1 S. E. 2d 88 (1939).
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §739 (Supp. 1950) "in any proceeding for a viola-
tion of the provisions of this act [Vehicle Code], or any local ordinance, rule or
regulation, the registration plate displayed on such vehicle shall be prima facie
evidence that the owner of such vehicle was operating the same. If at any hearing
or proceeding, the owner shall testify under oath that he was not operating the
said vehicle at the time of the alleged violation and shall submit himself to an
examination as to who at that time was operating such vehicle, and reveal the
name if known to him, then the prima facie evidence arising from the registration
plate shall be overcome and the burden of the proof shifted." Also, CoNN. GEN.
STAT. §2542 (1949) makes basically the same provision in cases of speeding, reck-
less driving, racing, and passing railway cars or school busses. See Notes, 33
MicH. L. REv. 1231 (1935); 33 MicH. L. Rxv. 443 (1935). Cf. Commonwealth
v. Ober, 285 Mass. 310, 189 N. E. 601 (1934) (registered owner of vehicle con-
victed of parking in violation of ordinance although there was no evidence that the
owner parked the vehicle himself).
"1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-71.1 (Supp. 1951) makes proof of the registration of
a motor vehicle in the name of any person or firm "prima facie evidence of owner-
ship and that such vehicle was being operated by or under control of a person for
whose conduct the owner was legally responsible, for the owner's befiefit, and
within the course and scope of his employment... .' in actions "to recover dam-
ages for injury to person or property, or for the death of a person, arising out of
an accident or collision involving a motor vehicle."
" State v. Newton, 207 N. C. 323, 177 S. E. 184 (1934).
"State v. Dooley, 232 N. C. 31, 59 S. E. 2d 808 (1950) (defendant left his
car shouting, "scatter, scatter, I wasn't driving").
" State v. Young, 187 N. C. 698, 122 S. E. 667 (1924). Note that the foot-
prints and tiretracks alone would not have been sufficient to identify defendant as
the perpetrator of the crime unless it is shown that they were made at the time
of the crime, and correspond respectively with the shoes worn by the accused at the
time of the crime and the car driven by the accused at the time, as well as having
been found at or near the place of the crime. State v. Palmer, 230 N. C. 205, 52
S. E. 2d 908 (1949) (collects principal cases on footprints and tiretracks).
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near the scene and a piece of metal corresponding to that missing from
his car is found at the scene' this has been held sufficient to link
defendant to the vehicle as the driver.
Thus, the evidence of identification in the instant case seems at least
as strong as was present in those cases. For, in addition to identifica-
tion of the automobile, the defendant admitted that he was the only
person driving his car on the night in question. If no one but the 'de-
fendant drove the car on the night in question, then the conclusion is
inescapable that he was driving it when it was observed by the officers.
While it is true that defendant's admission was coupled with a denial
that he was at the place in question the State can offer such distinct and
severable parts of the statement as tend to establish its own position' 7
and the jury may believe the whole or any part thereof.I S Thus, in
State v. King,'0 such an admission, coupled with a similar denial, was
held to be sufficient to identify the defendant as being the driver of the
automobile.
The evidence offered in the principal case seems to have been suffi-
cient for the court to have affirmed the trial court in overruling the de-
fendant's motion of non suit.2 0
HuRSHELL H. KEENER.
Executors and Administrators-Status of Back Pay
Owed Deceased Military Personnel
Title 10 of The United States Code, Section 868,1 provides in part:
"In the settlement of the accounts of deceased officers or en-
listed persons of the Army, where no demand is presented by a
10 State v. Durham, 201 N. C. 724, 161 S. E. 398 (1931). See Note, 99 A. L. R.
799 (1935).
Merely being seen near the scene is not sufficient to identify defendant as the
driver at the scene. State v. Ray, 229 N. C. 40, 47 S. E. 2d (1948) (defendant,
near scene of accident, driving truck which bore scratches and paint smears).
17 State v. Corpening, 157 N. C. 621, 73 S. E. 2d 214 (1911). But the de-
fendant is entitled to bring out those parts which tend to discharge him as well
as those which tend to charge him. State v. Watts, 224 N. C. 771, 32 S. E. 2d
348 (1944).
18 STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENcE §181 (1946).
10219 N. C. 667, 14 S. E. 2d 803 (1941). Marks led from the scene of the
accident to the defendant's damaged automobile. The defendant's admission that
no one else had driven his car on the night in question was held sufficient to
identify defendant as the driver of the vehicle, even though neither defendant nor
his vehicle were seen at or near the accident.
"0 The apparent conflict between the instant case and prior decisions on this
point could be reconciled by a statute creating a presumption that the owner of an
automobile is the driver. Such a presumption could be created by expanding N. C.
GEN. STAT. §20-71.1 (Supp. 1951), which creates such a presumption in certain
types of civil actions (see note 12 supra), to include violations of the motor
vehicle law. Such a statute undoubtedly has objectionable features (e.g., shifting
the burden of proof in a criminal action) which should be considered before any
changes are adopted. The legislature must weigh these objections against the need
for efficient law enforcement before determining the future policy of the State.
134 STAT. 1094 (1906), as amended, 10 U. S. C. §868 (1946).
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duly appointed legal representative of the estate, the accounting
officer may allow the amount found -due to the decedent's widow,
widower, or legal heirs in the following order of precedence:
First, to the widow or widower; Second, etc....
In a recent federal case,2 the plaintiff, mother of a deceased soldier
to whom the Government owed arrears in pay, was the sole beneficiary
under his will and was named as executrix. She had notified the Gen-
eral Accounting Office that as soon as she could legally qualify, she
would claim the amount due the decedent; and requested that the
money not be paid to anyone until she had been appointed executrix;
particularly, she requested that no money be paid to the deceased's
estranged wife. Nevertheless, before the mother could legally qualify
as executrix, the money was paid to the widow. The plaintiff brought
this suit against the Government, and the question before the court was
whether the liability of the Government had been discharged under
Section 868.
The court held that the mother did not, and could not, under the
Iowa law occupy the status of a "duly appointed legal representative
of the estate" at the time the request was made and at the time payment
was made; therefore, she had no capacity to claim or receive the money
owed the decedent, and the Government was discharged of liability for
,the debt by payment to the widow.
Although Section 868 does not mention whether or not the money
paid under its provisions are a part of the estate, the court, in rejecting
the plaintiff's contention that the relation back of letters testamentary
or of administration should apply, said that the funds are not a part of
the estate except as Congress allowed them to become such; and that
the funds were allowed to be a part of the estate only if a duly appointed
representative claimed the funds before they had been paid out.8
If the full implication of this portion of the decision were carried out,
it would mean that unless the executor or administrator could legally
qualify and file claim before the funds were paid out, he would have no
claim against anyone for the amount allowed and could not secure these
funds for the purposes of administration.
The Ohio Court of Common Pleas,4 however, in a suit by an execu-
trix against a widow who had received pay under the same statute,
held that the pay due the decedent was contractual in its nature; that it
2 Keown v. United States, 191 F. 2d 438 (8th Cir. 1951).
* "But the difficulty in the present situation with this argument is that the funds
involved did not constitute a part of the decedent's estate for the purpose of ad-
ministration, except as Congress had allowed them to become such, and Congress
did not allow them to become a part of the decedent's estate for the purposes of
administration from the fact of his death, but only from the fact that a duly ap-
pointed representative existed and had made demand before the money had been
otherwise paid out." Id. at 441-442.
' Scammon v. Scammon, 90 N. E. 2d 617 (Ohio C. P. 1950).
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constituted a part of the estate; and that the payment was received by
the wife in trust for the estate. The court stated that this section of
the code was not determinative of the right to take as between adverse
claimants; and compared it to the facility of payment clauses in insur-
ance policies. 5 This decision seems to be in harmony with the Con-
gressional intent and purpose.6
A Tennessee decision 7 held that a similar debt was a contractual
obligation of the Government, not a gratuity; that it was a vested right
and thus was a part of the estate; and that the father of the 'decedent
could not maintain an action against the executor of the estate for the
funds received.
In both the Ohio case and the Tennessee case, the courts met the
issue squarely and decided that payments made under the provisions of
this statute were a part of the estate of the decedent, and as such cor-
rectly go to the executor or administrator. It has also been held that
retroactive pay raises,8 debts due 'decedent by an employer, 9 debts due
from relatives,1 0 or due on account,": right to unpaid minimum com-
pensation, 12 right to reimbursement under special acts,' 3 and generally,
all debts, rights, and choses in action, vest as assets in the administrator,
whose duty it is to collect them.14 Thus, it seems, in spite of the state-
ment to the contrary in the principal case, that the money due the dece-
dent could constitute an asset of the estate.
Even though the Government's liability has been discharged, if the
money received by the widow is a part of the estate, the executrix might
then attempt to recover from the widow; and, as was done in the Ohio
case, the court could apply the principle used in controversies arising
under the facility of payment clauses of insurance policies' 5 and allow
the executrix to recover from the widow.' 6
Since the object of the federal statute in question is to eliminate the
necessity of legal proceedings in settling accounts of deceased personnel,
'For the purpose of facility of payment clauses, see Rhode v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 233 Mo. App. 865, 111 S. W. 2d 1006 (1937) and Uptegrove v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 51, 15 N. W. 2d 220 (1944). See also cases gathered
in Note 166 A. L. R. 15 (1947).
'U. S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE p. 1323 (1944).
Campbell v. Oliphant, 185 Tenn. 415, 206 S. W. 2d 406 (1947).
8 Joslyn v. Joslyn, 117 Mich. 442, 75 N. W. 930 (1898).
o Hawkins v. McCalla, 95 Ga. 192, 22 S. E. 141 (1894).
Penland v. Wells, 201 N. C. 173, 199 S. E. 423 (1931).Mayo v. Dawson, 160 N. C. 76, 76 S. E. 241 (1912).
' Fletcher v. Grinnel Bros., 64 F. Supp. 778 (E. D. Mich. 1943).
Briggs v. Walker, 171 U. S. 466 (1898).
"Howe v. Mohl, 168 Kan. 445, 214 P. 2d 298 (1950) ; Sullivan v. Doyle, 67
A. 2d 246 (Md. 1949).
" Lutostanski v. Lutostanski, 120 Conn. 471, 181 AtI. 533 (1935); Smith v.
Massie, Inc., 93"Ind. App. 582, 179 N. E. 20 (1931). Contra, In re Pierug's
Estate, 196 Misc. 1062, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 66 (1950).
" See cases collected in Note, 75 A. L. R. 1435 (1931) for rights of adverse
claimants of proceeds of policies paid under facility of payment clause.
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and thus relieve their families from added expense and trouble, it seems
that some modification of this statute is to be desired. Such a modifi-
cation should probably be in the nature of a prohibition against paying
such disputed claims before the legal representative can qualify and
claim the funds, particularly when the Government has notice of the
dispute.
BERNARD CR0WELL.
FELA Suits in Inconvenient State Courts-the Mayfield Case
The venue section of the Federal Eployers' Liability Act' gives a
plaintiff a wide choice in the selection of a forum, 2 but this privilege has
been abused3 to the extent that a huge interstate commerce in actions
brought under the FELA has developed through the efforts of certain
law firms in several metropolitan centers. 4
Since 1910 5 the FELA has expressly provided that a suit may be
brought in a state court, or in a United States district court, (1) in the
district of the residence of the defendant, or (2) in the district where
the cause of action arose, or (3) in any district in which the defendant
shall be doing business at the time.0
Efforts by some railroads to avoid being sued in forums inconvenient
to them, by the use of injunctions, were unsuccessful. The United
States Supreme Court, in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner,7 held
that a state court could not restrain a resident from continuing the
prosecution of a suit under the FELA in a distant federal district court,
or interfere with the privileges of federal venue.8 The following year,
'35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§51-59 (1946).
235 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946).
" The open door may admit those who seek not simply justice but perhapsjustice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff sometimes is under temptation
to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an ad-
versary, even at some inconvenience to himself." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U. S. 501, 507 (1947).
'Winters, Interstate Commerce in. Damage Suits, 29 JouR. Am. JUD. Soc. 135(1946). The chief centers are New York, Chicago, Baltimore, St. Louis, Min-
neapolis and Los Angeles. Many of these cases are brought from great distances,
some froni California to Chicago. See Winters supra at 137, and Note, 25 N. C.
L. REv. 379 (1947).
The original FELA, adopted in 1908, made no provision for venue. Follow-
ing Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 82 Conn. 373, 73 Atl. 762 (1909),
holding that courts of Connecticut did not have jurisdiction to entertain an action
based on the FELA, Congress amended the Act in 1910 to provide that "thejurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be con-
current with that of the courts of the several states. . . ." 36 STAT. 291, as
amended, 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946). The United States Supreme Court later com-
mented that "the amendment, as appears by its language, instead of granting juris-
diction to the state courts, presupposes that they already possessed it." Mondou
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 223 U. S. 1, 56 (1912).
' See note 2 mpra.7314 U. S. 44 (1941).
8 The injunction could not be used "for the benefit of the carrier or the national
transportation system, on the ground of cost, inconvenience or harassment." Balti-
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the same court, in Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. R.,9 held that a state court
could not restrain the prosecution of an action under the FELA in an-
other state court on account of inconvenience or harassment to the
defendant. 10
In 1948, Congress, with knowledge of the Kepner and Miles deci-
sions, enacted section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code." This section
provides that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought," which in
effect gives the federal courts the power to use the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.'2 In 1949, the United States Supreme Court held that
section 1404(a) not only applied to the general venue provisions ap-
plicable to the federal courts, but also the special venue provisions of
the FELA.' a
This development in the federal courts caused plaintiffs to resort to
the state courts-inasmuch as these courts were not subject to the pro-
visions of section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code. Attempts made by
railroads to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens to these suits
in state courts have had some interesting consequences.
The case of Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield14 was an
original proceeding in mandamus to compel a trial judge in Missouri to
use his discretion in passing on a motion, grounded solely on forum non
more & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44, 54 (1941). Inequity based on cost,
inconvenience or harassment is the argument most often presented in favor of
granting dismissal under the doctrine of forum non coveniens.0315 U. S. 698 (1942).
10 However, it had been held in Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890),
that the right of a state court to prevent unjust resort to the courts of another
state was well established. The decision in the Miles case seems to be limited
to the situation where a federal right is sought to be litigated in the other state
court, insasmuch as ". . . the Federal Constitution makes the laws of the United
States the supreme law of the land, binding on every citizen and every court and
enforceable wherever jurisdiction is adequate for the purpose . . .We are con-
sidering another state's power to so control its own citizens that they cannot exer-
cise the federal privilege of litigating a federal right in the court of another state."
Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 315 U. S. 698, 703, 704 (1942).
1162 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. §1404(a) (1950). Note, 29 N. C. L.
REv. 61 (1950) (concerned chiefly with the interpretation to be given section
1404 (a)).
" The doctrine of forum non conveniens "deals with the discretionary power of
a court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction whenever it appears that the
cause before it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere." Blair, The Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1929).
See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Convenieis, 35 CALIF. L. Rav. 380
(1947).
"
3Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55 (1949). Section 1404(a) was also held to
apply to the special venue provisions in the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 26 STAT.
209 (1890), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§4, 5 (1946). United States v. National
City Lines, 337 U. S. 78 (1949). Justices Black and Douglas dissented in this
case and in Ex parte Collett, mupra, on the ground that Congress has not made it
sufficiently clear that "any civil action" as used in section 1404(a) extended to
special venue statutes not found in the Judicial Code, Title 28, U. S. C.
" 359 Mo. 827, 224 S. W. 2d 105 (1949).
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conveniens, to dismiss an action brought by a non-resident under the
FELA.15 The Missouri Supreme Court held that the judge could not
in the exercise of 'discretion grant a dismissal. The case involved one
accident which occurred in Tennessee, 700 miles distant from the forum,
and another which occurred in Oklahoma, 647 miles distant.1 6 This
decision seems to be grounded on two principles: (1) That "under the
Kepner and Miles cases, a state court cannot dismiss a Federal Em-
ployers' Liability case solely under the forum non conveniens doc-
trine,"17 and (2) that a dismissal would violate the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution.' 8 Upon cer-
tiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed this decision,' 0 say-
ing that "if the Supreme Court of Missouri held as it did because it
felt under compulsion of federal law as enunciated by this Court2 o so to
hold, it should be relieved of that compulsion. It should be freed to
dlecide the availability of the principle of forum non conveniens in these
suits according to its own local law."2' 1 [Italics added.]
The United States Supreme Court further stated in the Mayfield
case22 that a state court decision to the effect that the doctrine of foruom
non conveniens cannot bar an action brought under the FELA, might be
based on one of three possible theories: (1) That according to its own
notions of procedural policy, the doctrine is not part of its law (where
no federal issue is involved), or (2) that by reason of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, a state may not discriminate against citizens of sister
states, or (3) that previously announced federal law compelled such a
decision (which compulsion the court held not to exist).
In relation to theory (2), the Court stated:
"Therefore Missouri cannot allow suits by non-resident Mis-
sourians for liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
arising out of conduct outside that state and discriminatorily deny
access to its courts to a non-resident who is a citizen of another
state."'28  [Italics added.]
" Undoubtedly, the only thing the railroad had to gain in compelling the use of
discretion in passing on the motion to dismiss on the theory of forum non con-
veniens was the bare chance that the court would have decided that the motion
should have been granted due to the hardship on the defendant in defending in
that forum.
1" State ex rel. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Murphy, 359 Mo. 827, 224 S. W.
2d 105 (1949), was a case on precisely the same question and was consolidated
with the Mayfield case.
117 Id. at 837, 224 S. W. 2d at 107.
18 "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several states." U. S. CONST. ART. IV, §2.
19 Missouri ex tel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (1950).
90 The Court here was referring to the Kepner and Miles decisions. Justice
Jackson in a concurring opinion, Id. at 5, stated: "The Missouri Court appears to
have acted under the supposed compulsion of Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 315
U. S. 698...."
-"Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1, 5 (1950).See note 20 supra.
23 Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1, 5 (1950). There is
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This raises an important constitutional question. The Court has held
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause secures to citizens of one
state the right to resort to the courts of another state.24 Although this
guarantee has certain qualifications, the Clause does not require a
state to supply its courts with such jurisdiction that citizens of other
states may litigate certain classes of cases, unless it affords juris-
diction to the same classes of cases brought by its own citizens, 25
even when rights under the Constitution are sought to be adjudged.
The Clause only "requires a state to accord to citizens of other states
substantially the same right of access to its courts as it accords to its
own citizens."20  The right to resort to the courts of another state is
conditioned upon that court's jurisdiction as determined by local law2 7
and its own notions of procedural rules.28 One of these rules is the doc-
trine of forum iwit conveniens,2 9 but like other procedural rules, it must
apply alike to citizens of the state as well as to citizens of sister states.30
some feeling that Justice Frankfurter here might have been thinking of the avail-
ability of the courts rather than the availability of forumn nor conveniens, since the
Privileges and Immunities Clause could not prevent the use of forum non con-
veniens except in a situation where the state had a policy of applying the doctrine
to one class of citizens and not to another.
2' Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U. S. 533 (1922). "The
right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for
the purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim
the benefit of habeas corpus; to institute actions of any kind in the courts of the
state; ...may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities
of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental. . . ." Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552, No. 3,
230 (E. D. Pa. 1823). Under a state statute which provided that a foreign cor-
poration could be sued by a non-resident in the state courts only when the foreign
corporation was doing business in that state, no violation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause occurred since the discrimination was made on the basis of
residence and not citizenship. Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 279 U. S.
377 (1929). A statute which prohibited the bringing of an action for wrongful
death in the state unless the deceased was a citizen of that state was held valid,
because the discrimination was not based on the citizenship of the person bringing
the suit. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 207 U. S. 142 (1907).
" Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373 (1903).
-
0McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 292 U. S. 230, 233 (1934).
27 "But, subject to the restrictions of the Federal Constitution, the state may
determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the con-
troversies which shall be heard in them. The State policy decides whether and to
what extent the state will entertain in its courts transitory actions, where the
causes of action have arisen in other jurisdictions." Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R., 207 U. S. 142, 148 (1907).
2. "It [venue section of the FELA] does not preclude any procedural require-
ment of the forum which plaintiff selects for the trial of the case. Plaintiff's
attempt to stretch the decisions to preclude the power to enforce local rules, or
local methods of procedure, or any of the usual practice regulations, other than
those relating to venue, seems contrary to the very terms of the section itself...
Grant v. Pennsylvania R. R., 8 F. R. D. 40, 41 (1948).
2" Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1947);
Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. R., 326 U. S. 549 (1946).
"0 "But any policy the state may choose to adopt must operate in the same way
on its own citizens and those of other states. The privileges which it affords to
one class it must afford to the other." Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 207
U. S. 142, 148 (1907).
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Since the decisions in the Kepner and Miles cases have been clarified by
the Mayfield decision,31 there seems to be nothing in the FELA to com-
pel state courts to entertain cases brought under it, and this has been
frequently stated. 2 It follows that an action brought in a state court
under the FELA would be subject to the doctrine of forum non con-
vetiens, if the state court permitted the doctrine to be used when an
action under the FELA is brought by a citizen of the forum. Conversely,
if the forum did not allow the doctrine in FELA suits by its own citizens,
a policy allowing it when the action is by a non-resident citizen 83 of a
sister state would violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.3 4 Thus,
if state A does not allow the doctrine to be used by defendant X, citizen
of state Y, when X is sued by citizens of state A, then to allow the doc-
trine to be used by X when sued by citizens of state B would result in
unconstitutional discrimination against citizens of state B.
Faced with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court, the
Missouri Supreme Court, dealing with the case for the second time,85
merely reiterated that since it was the policy of that state to allow citi-
zens of Missouri (resident and non-resident) to bring and maintain suits
under the FELA in Missouri courts, that to bar citizens of other states
from doing likewise would violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
This leaves something to be desired, in that it seems to contemplate
mere jurisdiction, for the court nowhere said that it had a policy re-
jecting forum non conveniens in FELA suits brought by its own citi-
zens. Before a motion to 'dismiss based on the doctrine can be enter-
1 "But neither of these cases limited the power of a State to deny access to its
courts to persons seeking recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act if
in similar cases the State for reasons of local policy denies resort to its courts and
enforces its policy impartially . . . so as not to involve a discrimination against
Employers' Liability Act suits and not to offend against the Privileges-and-Immuni-
ties Clause of the Constitution. No such restriction is imposed upon the States
merely because the Employers' Liability Act empowers their courts to entertain
suits arising under it." 340 U. S. 1, 4 (1950).2 Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 223 U. S. 1, 56 (1912). "As to
the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act, that statute does not
purport to require State courts to entertain suits arising under it but only to em-
power them to do so, so far as the authority of the United States is concerned
... but there is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to force a duty upon
such Courts as against an otherwise valid excuse." Douglas v. New York, N. H.
& H. R. R., 279 U. S. 377, 387 (1929). See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 120(1945).( It seems that few, if any, situations would arise where a court would dismiss
an action brought by a resident citizen of a sister state, since in that situation, it
would be imposing an obvious hardship on the plaintiff to force him to bring his
action in a court outside the state of his residence.
" If the discrimination is based on the residence of the litigant rather than on
his citizenship, the discrimination is valid under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. "But if a state chooses to (prefer) residents in access to often over-
crowded courts and to deny such access to all non-residents, whether its own
citizens or those of other States, it is a choice within its own control." Missouri
ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1, 4 (1950).
" State ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 240 S. W. 2d 106 (Mo. 1951), cer-
tiorari denied, 72 S. Ct. 107 (U. S. 1951).
[Vol. 30
1952] NOTES AND COMMENTS 173
tained, the court must have jurisdiction,3 6 and then consideration of
the motion is in the discretion of the court. Since Missouri accepts
jurisdiction, in order to discriminatorily deny access to its courts to
citizens of sister states, it would have to formulate a policy whereby
the doctrine of forum non conveniens was available to defendants
sued by citizens of sister states, but not to defendants sued by citi-
zens of Missouri. The only Missouri case cited by the Missouri court8 7
in the last decision to substantiate its position was a case dealing with
the jurisdiction of the court and not the availability of forum non con-
veniens. However, there is some indication that this doctrine is not
part of the law of Missouri, for in at least one previous case38 involving
a motion to dismiss an FELA suit, on the ground that the cause of action
arose in the state of Illinois, that all parties were residents and citizens
of Illinois, and that the plaintiff could have brought his suit in Illinois,
the court held that the interpretation given its statutes 'did not give it
discretion to decline jurisdiction.
New York and Utah have held that an action brought under the
FELA may be dismissed without the benefit of a controlling statute.3 9
Illinois and Ohio have held that because of certain venue statutes, an
FELA suit may not be maintained there as a matter of right ;40 while
Missouri and California have held that their courts are not invested with
the discretion to deny jurisdiction when the action is brought in the
inconvenient forum.4 1  Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire and New Jersey have indicated that their courts have the discre-
tion to deny jurisdiction of a transitory cause of action between two
non-residents.42 Other jurisdictions have either failed to decide the
"o "Indeed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is an
absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S.
501, 504 (1947).
' State ex rel Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 135, 143 S. W.
483 (1911).
.8 Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840, 20 S. W. 2d 684 (1929).
"
0 New, York. Murnan v. Wabash Ry., 246 N. Y. 244, 158 N. E. 508 (1927);
Utah. Mooney v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R-, 221 P. 2d 628 (Utah 1950) (motion
for dismissal denied on other grounds).
" Illinois. Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N. E. 2 (1917) (wrongful death
action under FELA, statute prohibited wrongful death action for death occurring
in another state). Ohio. Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. R., 107 Ohio St. 352, 140
N. E. 94 (1923) (state statute excluded from jurisdiction of state courts all actions
for wrongful death occurring without the state unless the claimant is a resident of
the state).
" Missouri. See note 34 supra. California. Leet v. Union Pac. R. R., 25 Cal.
2d 605, 155 P. 2d 42 (1944). In this case, the Kepuer and Miles decisions were
cited as controlling authority that California had to grant jurisdiction. Query:
Would California so hold after the Mayfield decision?
"
2 Florida. Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla. 247, 169 So. 391 (1936) (suit for specific
performance of separation agreement where both parties were non-residents of the
forum). Louisiana. Union City Transfer v. Fields, 199 So. 206 (La. App. 1940)
(action on a promissory note made and payable in Texas, both parties being resi-
dents of Texas). Massachusetts. Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank,
281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152 (1933) (action by domestic corporation, as assignee
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question or have indicated that their courts do not have the liscretion
to decline jurisdiction.43
Looking at the effect of the Mayfield decision upon the overall prob-
lem faced by the railroads in coping with the inconvenient FELA suit,
little if anything has been achieved. The most that can be said is that
the compulsion previously thought to exist under the Kepner and Miles
decisions is now removed, as well as any compulsion thought to exist in
the Act itself. Only the litigant's rights under the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause remain mandatory upon the state court. Accordingly,
some additional remedy is necessary to eliminate the unethical practices
of "ambulance chasing" firms, and the consequent inequitable burden
placed upon the railroads in defending the inconvenient suit.
In 1947, the House of Representatives passed the Jennings Bill,4 4
which would have amended Section 6 of the FELA to authorize the
bringing of an action under the Act only in the district or state where
the accident occurred or where the injured party resided, and only when
the railroad could not be served in either place could an action be brought
wherever the railroad was doing business. 45 It seems clear that by so
of bank deposit by Russian bank, brought against English bank of deposit not
doing business in United States; refusal to retain jurisdiction under rules of
comity and under doctrine of forum non conveniens). New Hampshire. Jackson
& Sons v. Lumbermens' Mut. Cas. Co., 86 N. H. 341, 168 Atl. 895 (1933) (action
by insured against its liability insurer for negligently conducting the defense of a
suit against thie insured where both parties were residents of other states). New
Jersey. Anderson v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 18 N. J. Misc. 153, 11 A. 2d 607
(1940) (action by residents of Pennsylvania against a Pennsylvania corporation
for wrongful death occurring in Pennsylvania).
"3 North Carolina is typical of these states. See McDonald v. MacArthur Bros.
Co., 154 N. C. 122, 69 S. E. 832 (1910). The majority of the states which have
denied their courts this discretion have so held because they have felt that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution prohibited it.
""A civil suit for damages for wrongful death or personal injuries against any
interstate common carrier by railroad may be brought only in a district court of
the United States or in a State court of competent jurisdiction, in the district or
county (parish), respectively, in which the cause of action arose, or where the
person suffering death or injury resided at the time it arose: Provided; That if
the defendant cannot be served with process issuing out of any of the courts afore-
mentioned, then and only then, the action may be brought in a district court of the
United States, or in a State court of competent jurisdiction, at any place where the
defendant shall be doing business at the time of the institution of said action."
H. R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
" The opponents of the Bill argued that the solution to the problem was in the
prevention of solicitation rather than in curbing the wide venue privileges. Pas-
carella v. New York Cent. R. R., 81 F. Supp. 95 (E. D. N. Y. 1948). Labor argues
that these FELA suits should be brought in industrial centers where juries are
more capable of assessing damages, due to their own peculiar knowledge of the
needs of the working class. But this seems to amount to little more than an argu-
ment that plaintiffs under the FELA should be allowed to go "shopping" for a
favorable court and jury. On the other side the argument exists that something
must be done to curb the unethical practices of the handful of "ambulance chasing"
lawyers. It is apparent that state laws and local bar associations are not effectively
controlling this matter. A balancing of these arguments seems to weigh in favor
of curbing the venue privileges.
[Vol. 30
NOTES AND COMMENTS
narrowing the venue, the solicitation of suits40 would be greatly reduced.
The Bill died in a Senate committee.
Another possible solution would be the creation of a workmen's com-
pensation act applicable to employees of interstate railroads.4 7 A rea-
sonable compensation for all injuries sustained, regardless of negligence,
might prove to be more desirable than a few cases of very large recov-
eries where the injury is a major one and where the railroad is clearly
negligent. However, the adoption of a federal act in this field seems
unlikely.4 8
The evils surrounding the misuse of the venue privileges given by
the Act could be greatly diminished by each state adopting the doctrine
of forum non conveniens as part of its law, but at best this result would.
be slow and decidedly uncertain. Due to the inability of Congress or the
federal courts, as 'displayed by the Mayfield case, to make the doctrine
of forum von conveniens available as a procedural rule in the state
courts, 40 serious reconsideration should be given to the Jennings Bill
as offering the better solution to a proper administration of the federal
act. Certainly, such flaunting of legal ethics and principles of justice5°
demands immediate and well considered attention.
WILLIAM C. MORIMS, JR.
Life Insurance-Killing of Insured by Primary Beneficiary-
Recovery by Contingent Beneficiary
It has been almost universally held, based on broad grounds of pub-
lic policy, that the beneficiary of a life insurance contract who intention-
ally and wrongfully kills the insured cannot recover the policy proceeds.
This does not absolve the insurer from liability under the usual insurance
contract, but only denies the beneficiary's right to recover. Under such
circumstances the benefits may be recovered by the estate of the deceased
insured on a constructive trust theory. However, the insurer has been
held absolutely relieved of all liability under the policy where the bene-
ficiary at the time of obtaining the policy of insurance intended to mur-
"' An example of a state statute authorizing injunction against solicitation in
this field is N. C. GEN. STAT. §84-38 (1950). This statute is discussed in 25 N. C.
L. REv. 379 (1947).
'" Winters, Interstate Commerce in Damage Suits, 29 Joun. Am. JUD. Soc. 135,
144 (1946).
8 Ibid. Labor generally regards the maximum benefits obtainable under existing
state acts as far too small.
'' Due to the fact that Congress cannot make procedural rules for the courts
which it does not create, it is generally conceded that Congress may not make theforum non conveniens doctrine available as a procedural rule in state courts. This
seems to be borne out by the fact that Congress, in enacting section 1404(a) of the
Judicial Code (28 U. S. C.), made no attempt to apply that section to state courts
in which actions under the FELA might be brought.
" For an example, see Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. v. Wolf, 199 Wis. 278,
226 N. W. 297 (1929).
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der the insured, or where the policy contained a clause specifically
making the contract void upon the happening of such an occurence. 1
While there is abundant authority to support the foregoing principles,
the recent case of Bullock v. Expressmeiv's Mitt. Life Ins. Coo" presented
the North Carolina Supreme Court with a somewhat similar fact situa-
tion on which there is scant authority.3 The deceased insured had pro-
cured a life insurance policy naming his wife as primary beneficiary and
a foster son as contingent beneficiary. 4 Insured was killed by his wife
who was convicted of manslaughter, sentenced to five years imprison-
ment, and was thereby disqualified from taking either as primary bene-
ficiary under the policy5 or from the deceased's personal estate.0  The
court, applying a strict construction to the insurance contract, held that
the contingent provision necessary to qualify the foster son to take as
beneficiary had not been fulfilled as the primary beneficiary had not
predeceased the insured; therefore, the administrator of the insured's
estate was allowed to recover.
The precise issue raised in the instant case was presented to an Ohio
lower court in Neff v. Massachusetts Mitt. Life Ins. Co.7 and a con-
trary result was reached. That court allowed the contingent beneficiary
to recover, holding that when the contract of insurance named secondary
or contingent beneficiaries, the insured had clearly indicated how the
proceeds of the policy were to be paid; therefore, the contingent provi-
sions of the contract should be carried out. It was noted that in those
cases where the estate of the insured had been awarded the proceeds of
'APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcrIcE §§381-385 (1941); 6 COOLEY'S
BRiEFs ON INSURANCE 5227 (2d ed. 1927); RiCHrARDS, LAW OF INSURANCE §335
(4th ed., Long, 1932) ; VANCE, INSURANCE §117 (3d ed., Anderson, 1951) ; Gross-
man, Liability and Rights of the Inmurer When the Death of the Insured Is Caused
by the Beneficiary or by an Assignee, 10 B. U. L. R.v. 281 (1930) ; Notes, 7
A. L. R. 828 (1920), 27 A. L. R. 1521 (1923), 70 A. L. RM 1539 (1931), 91 A. L. R.
1488 (1934) ; 29 Am. JUR. §1310 (1940) ; 46 C. J. S. §1171 (1946).
2234 N. C. 254, 67 S. E. 2d 71 (1951).
3 The writer found three cases with comparable fact situations. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F. Supp. 228 (E. D. Mich. 1941) (group insurance
policy wherein the order of contingent beneficiaries was set forth) ; Welch v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. Supp. 748 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (insured's estate named
as contingent beneficiary) ; Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 228 P. 2d 832 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (beneficiary sentenced to life imprisonment which, under
California statute, is treated as civil death and has the same legal effect as physical
death). However, only one case was discovered which was on "all fours" with
the principal case. Neff v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 96 N. E. 2d 53 (Ohio
C. P. 1951). None of these cases was decided by a court of final jurisdiction.
"Beneficiary provision was ". . . to [M], wife of the insured if living or if
not living to [R], son of the insured ... . Transcript of Record, p. 8, Bullock
v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N. C. 254, 67 S. E. 2d 71 (1951).
"Anderson v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 152 N. C. 1, 67 S. E. 53 (1910).
' Garner v. Phillips, 229 N. C. 160, 47 S. E. 2d 845 (1948) ; Bryant v. Bryant,
193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§28-10, 30-4, 52-19 (1950).
'96 N. E. 2d 53 (Ohio C. P. 1951) The court stated the issue to be ... when
an insured has been murdered by the primary beneficiary, should the proceeds of
the life insurance policy be paid to the insured's estate or to the persons named in
the insurance policy as contingent or secondary beneficiaries?"
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an insurance policy, there had been a complete failure of beneficiaries.
Thus the court appears to have reached an equitable result effectuating
the intent of the insured without changing the terms of the contract.8
The North Carolina court's construction of the contract may well
be questioned. It has been said that the intention of the parties is the
"polar star" of construction of an insurance contract, 9 and that it is a
practical rather than a literal or technical construction which is deemed
desirable. 10 The intention of the insured is the controlling element,1"
and a provision for disposition of the proceeds on the insured's death
must be construed as the insured intended.12  The mere fact that the
insured named a contingent beneficiary seems clearly to express his in-
tention as to whom should be the recipient of the policy proceeds in lieu
of the primary beneficiary. Had the primary beneficiary predeceased
the insured, undoubtedly the contingent beneficiary would have taken
under the policy. What, then, is the distinction between disqualifica-
tion by death and disqualification by law? Permitting recovery by the
contingent beneficiary in the Bullock case would seem to have been both
a reasonable and logical interpretation of the contract without reading
anything into it.
A line of argument, not advanced to the court in the Bullock case,
would allow the contingent beneficiary to recover under the precise
terms of the insurance contract. On the death of the insured, the pri-
mary beneficiary's rights become vested and he holds the legal claim to
the proceeds of the policy.' 3 However, on well established principles
of public policy, the beneficiary may not receive and enjoy the benefits
of this claim. 14 Therefore, a constructive trust could be imposed upon.
this interest in the hands of the primary beneficiary.' 5 Once this con-
structive trust is established, the next step to be taken is the 'determina-
tion of the beneficiary of this trust. It would seem that such a deter-
mination should be based upon the intention of the insured, if ascertain-
able. Where the insured has clearly expressed his intent by naming a
contingent beneficiary, even though the contingency has not occurred,
the court should recognize this intention by designating the contingent
'The North Carolina court stated that to reach such a result would be chang-
ing the terms of the contract which it had no power to do. Bullock v. Express-
men's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N. C. 254, 258, 67 S. E. 2d 71, 74 (1951).
'13 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE §7385 (1940).10 13 id. §7386. 1 2 id. §781. 1 13 id. §7424. 13 2 id. §921.
1 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591 (1886) ; Anderson v. Life
Ins. Co. of Virginia, 152 N. C. 1, 67 S. E. 53 (1910); VANCE INSURANCE §117
(3d ed., Anderson, 1951).
"
0 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §189 (1937); 3 ScoTr, TRUSTS §494.1 (1939).
Although the North Carolina court did not infer that it was using the construc-
tive trust theory in the Bullock case, note 2 supra, or in the Anderson case, supra
note 14, it has employed that device to prevent a murderer from acquiring property
by his own wrongful act. Garner v. Phillips, 229 N. C. 160, 47 S. E. 2d 845(1948) ; Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 232 (1948).
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beneficiary as the recipient of the trust.16 In reaching such a result,
the court would have (1) carried out the express terms of the contract,
(2) applied the constructive trust theory to prevent a party from
profiting by his own wrongdoing, and (3) reached an equitable result
effectuating the intent of the insured.
While some jurisdictions have passed statutes allowing the contingent
beneficiary to receive the proceeds of the policy in such a situation, 17
other jurisdictions have reached the same result' 8 without statutory aid
and with the approval of those writers 19 who have commented on the
subject. A similar result has also been reached by courts confronted
"
6It should be noted that both the RESTATEMENT and Scorr, id., state that the
beneficiary holds his interest under the policy upon a constructive trust for the
estate of the insured. Apparently, however, this result is meant to apply only
when there is no contingent beneficiary named in the contract for it is Scott's
contention that in such a situation the contingent beneficiary should receive the
policy proceeds and not the estate of the insured.
" NED. REV. STAT. §30-120 (1943) : "No person who has been convicted of un-
lawfully killing another, or conspiring unlawfully to kill another, shall be entitled
to any insurance on the life of the deceased. If the person so convicted is the
beneficiary under any policy or policies of life insurance, or beneficial certificate
or certificates, such insurance shall go to the person or persons who would have
been entitled thereto if the person so convicted had been dead at the date of the
death of the deceased."
S. D. CODE §56.0510 (1939) : "Insurance proceeds payable to the slayer as the
beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate of insurance on the life of the
decedent, or as the survivor of a joint life policy, shall be paid to the estate of
the decedent, unless the policy or certificate designates some person not claiming
through the slayer as alternative beneficiary to him. .. ."
Other states have statutes directing that the insurance proceeds shall be dis-
bursed by the laws of descent and distribution:
IOWA CODE ANN. §636.49 (1950) : "In every instance mentioned in section ...
636.48 [that section bars a beneficiary, who has taken the life of the insured, from
receiving the policy proceeds], all benefits that would accrue to any such person
upon the death ... of the person whose life is thus taken ... shall become subject
to distribution among the other heirs of such deceased person, according to the
foregoing rules of descent and distribution in case of death .... "
Of like effect: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, §231 (1938); ORE. CoBiP. LAWS ANN.§16-203 (1940).
See McDade v. Mystic Workers of the World, 196 Ia. 857, 860, 195 N. W. 603,
604 (1923). The court in construing the Iowa statute stated that "The statute was
evidently meant to meet a situation where a policy of insurance is made payable
to a beneficiary who takes the life of the insured, and where there is no provision
whatever in the policy as to the disposition of the proceeds of the insurance."
"8 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F. Supp. 228 (E. D. Mich. 1941);
Welch v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. Supp. 748 (Sup. Ct. 1919) ; Neff v. Massa-
chusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 96 N. E. 2d 53 (Ohio C. P. 1951) ; accord, Beck v.
West Coast Life Ins. Co., 228 P. 2d 832 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) ; see, Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. v. Weightman, 61 Okla. 106, 111, 160 Pac. 629, 634 (1916).
193 ScoTt, TRUSTS §494.1 (1939) : "If by the terms of the policy, or in the case
of a fraternal organization by the by-laws of the organization, an alternative bene-
ficiary is designated, and the principal beneficiary murders the insured, the alterna-
tive beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds of the policy." See Wade, Acquisition
of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARv. L.
REv. 715, 742 (1936).
It is interesting to note that both authors and the Ohio court in the Neff case,
note 7 supra, cited Parker v. Potter, 200 N. C. 348, 157 S. E. 68 (1931), to sup-




with this problem when mutual benefit association certificates were in-
volved. 20 Concededly, these cases are distinguishable in that the asso-
ciation's charter or by-laws contained a provision for alternative or
contingent beneficiaries if the original designation failed; yet, any 'dis-
tinction appears unreal when an old line insurance policy contains a con-
tingent beneficiary provision.
As the precise issue presented by the Bullock case was one of first
impression before any court of final jurisdiction in the United States,21
it is regrettable that the decision reached was contrary to the existing
authority on the subject. Furthermore, as the result was patently con-
trary to the intention of the insured22 and will probably be binding on
the court under the doctrine of stare decisis, the following statutory
proposal is offered for consideration:
Where the beneficiary of a life insurance policy or certificate, or
the assignee of such policy or certificate, or the survivor of a
joint life policy or certificate, has feloniously taken, or procured to
be taken, the life of the insured, any proceeds payable under the
terms of such policy or certificate shall be paid to any alternative
or contingent beneficiary named in the policy or certificate who
does not claim through the slayer; provided, if no alternative or
contingent beneficiary is designated in the policy or certificate,
such proceeds shall be paid to the estate of the insured decedent. 23
DAVID L. STRAIN, JR.
Negligence-Automobiles-Joint Enterprise
In cases involving automobile accidents, North Carolina has recog-
nized and followed the joint enterprise doctrine since 1921.1 In a re-
cent 'decision, James v. Atlantic & E. C. R. R.,2 the court stated that
20 Supreme Lodge v. Menkhausen, 209 Ill. 277, 70 N. E. 567 (1904) ; Schmidt
v. Northern Life Ass'n., 112 Ia. 41, 83 N. W. 800 (1900); Sharpless v. Grand
Lodge, 135 Minn. 35, 159 N. W. 1086 (1916).
21 See note 3 supra.
Bullock v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N. C. 254, 258, 67 S. E. 2d
71, 74 (1951) (". . . in the case at bar it may be presumed in the light of subse-
quent happenings the insured would have wished his foster son to have the in-
surance money. .. ").
2 See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfidly Killing Another-A Statu-
tory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REv. 715, 741 (1936), for an extensive discussion of the
intent and purpose of such a statute.
1Pusey v.* Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 181 N. C. 137, 106 S. E. 452 (1921).
In the Pusey case the court seemingly states that the doctrine of joint enterprise
was adopted by North Carolina in Hunt v. Railroad, 170 N. C. 442, 87 S. E. 210
(1915), but the court in the Hunt case does not mention the doctrine. It merely
reiterates the rule that the negligence of the driver will not be imputed to a pas-
senger unless he is the owner of the car or controls the driver in some way.
2 233 N. C. 591, 65 S. E. 2d 214 (1951). Other N. C. cases dealing with the
doctrine are: Matheny v. Central Motor Lines, 233 N. C. 681, 65 S. E. 2d 368
(1951) ; Rollison v. Hicks, 233 N. C. 99, 63 S. E. 2d 190 (1951) ; Pike v. Seymour,
222 N. C. 42, 21 S. E. 2d 884 (1942) ; Harper v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 211
N. C. 398, 190 S. E. 750 (1937); Exum v. Poole, 207 N. C. 244, 176 S. E. 556
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when two or more persons are engaged in a joint enterprise, the con-
tributory negligence of one of them will be imputed to the others so as
to bar their recovery against a negligent defendant.3
In the James case, the plaintiff and the driver of the automobile
were police officers, fellow employees of the city of Goldsboro, and were
of equal rank. While engaged in their duty of patrolling the city, they
were involved in an accident with a switch engine belonging to the
defendant railroad. The court concluded that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that the officers were engaged in a joint
enterprise; that they were mutually engaged in a joint undertaking for
a common purpose; and each had an equal right of control in the man-
agement of the automobile. Therefore, any contributory negligence on
the part of the driver would be imputed to the plaintiff so as to bar his
recovery from the defendant.
In the famous case of Thorogood v. Bryan,4 the court held that the
negligence of the driver of a conveyance would be imputed to a pas-
senger therein. But the English court later repudiated this unreasonable
rule in the case of Mills v. Arntrong5 insofar as it was applied to
passengers having no control over the driver. Though some American
courts followed the rule of the Thorogood decision, most of them have
likewise repudiated its original broad application and now hold that the
negligence of the driver will not be imputed to a inere passenger or
guest.6 North Carolina has never adopted the broad rule of the Thoro-
good case.7
One of the exceptions to the general proposition that the negligence
of a driver will not be imputed to a passenger is the doctrine of imputed
negligence as applied in the case of a joint enterprise.8 The scope of
(1934); Newman v. Queen City Coach Co., 205 N. C. 26, 169 S. E. 808 (1933);
Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C. 749, 161 S. E. 389 (1931) ; Albritton v. Hill, 190
N. C. 429, 130 S. E. 5 (1925) ; Pusey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 181 N. C. 137,
106 S. E. 452 (1921).
' However, the case was sent back for a new trial because of erroneous instruc-
tions given by the trial judge with respect to the burden of proof on the issue of
contributory negligence.
The terms johit enterprise and imputed negligence, should not be confused.
Imputed negligence is used to hold one person liable for the negligence of another
in certain situations. Joint enterprise is one of those situations where negligence
will be imputed.
'8 C. B. 115 (1849).
13 App. Cas. 1, 58 L. T. 425 (1887).
o Bessey v. Salemme, 302 Mass. 188, 19 N. E. 2d 75 (1939) ; Bunting v. Hog-
sett, 139 Pa. 363, 21 Atl. 31 (1890) ; Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wisc. 493, 181 N. W.
739 (1921) ; See collection of cases in 38 Am. JUR. p. 936 n. 20 (1941).
'Duval v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 134 N. C. 331, 46 S. E. 750 (1904);
Crampton v. Ivie, 124 N. C. 591, 32 S. E. 968 (1889).
82 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW, §28 (1927); Negligence
may, of course be imputed in master-servant relationships, Rollison v. Hicks, 233
N. C. 99, 65 S. E. 2d 190 (1951), and principal-agent relationships, Snow v.
DeButts, 212 N. C. 120, 193 S. E. 224 (1937), and when the doctrine of joint
enterprise can be applied.
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this note is primarily concerned with the application of the doctrine of
imputed negligence in automobile accident cases where the occupants
of one of the vehicles were engaged in a joint enterprise at the time of
the accident.
As the court states in the principal case, "much has been written on
what is not a joint enterprise, rather than what is."9  In the James case
however, the court quotes the following excellent statement of the rule
from Blashfield.' 0
"An essential and perhaps the central element which must be
shown in order to establish a joint enterprise is the existence of
joint control over the management and operation of the vehicle
and the course and conduct of the trip . . . in order that two per-
sons riding in an automobile, one of them driving, may be deemed
engaged in a joint enterprise for the purpose of imputing the neg-
ligence of the driver to the other, [there must] exist concurrently
two fundamental and primary requisites, to wit, a community of
interest in the object and purpose of the undertaking in which the
automobile is being driven, and an equal right to direct and govern
the movements and conduct of each other in respect thereto. The
mere fact that the occupant has no opportunity to exercise physi-
cal control is immaterial." 11
Some states have held that a joint enterprise may exist without the
element of the legal right of joint control. 12 But apparently North Caro-
lina has, from the first case dealing with the subject, required the
presence of the legal right to control, or actual control of the operation
of the vehicle before invoking the doctrine of imputed negligence.' 3
The doctrine can also be applied when a third person is trying to hold
the passenger liable to him because of the negligence of the driver. So
far this situation has not arisen in North Carolina, but when and if it
does, the court might well follow the Restatement of Torts rule14 and
9 James v. Atlantic & E. C. R. R., supra note 2 at 598.
14 BLASHFELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW, §2372 (Perm. Ed.).
" Id., cited in James v. Railroad, 233 N. C. 591, 598, 65 S. E. 2d 214, 219(1951).
'- Otis v. Kolsky, 94 Pa. Super. 548 (1929) ; Lawrence v. Denver & R. G. Ry.
Co., 52 Utah" 414, 174 Pac. 817 (1918); Washington & 0. D. Railroad v. Zell,
118 Va. 755; 88 S. E. 309 (1916) ; Wentworth v. Town of Waterbury, 90 Vt. 60,
96 At. 334 (1916); Hurley v. City of Spokane, 126 Wash. 213, 217 Pac. 1004(1923).
" Pusey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., supra note 1 at 142. Without evidence
of joint control in the operation of the automobile, there can be no joint enterprise.
For other cases on this point, see Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 205
N. C. 127, 170 S. E. 120 (1933); Williams v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 187 N. C.
348, 121 S. E. 608 (1924) ; White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N. C. 536, 109 S. E.
564 (1921) ; and cases cited therein.
For cases holding that there was no joint enterprise even though the element
of community of interest was present, see Jernigan v. Jernigan, 207 N. C. 831, 178
S. E. 587 (1935) and Newman v. Queen City Coach Co., 205 N. C. 26, 169 S. E.
808 (1933).
1 4
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §491 (1938), Any one of several persons engaged in
an enterprise is barred from recovery against a negligent defendant by the con-
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hold the passenger liable for the negligence of the driver in an action
by an injured third party.
However, the joint enterprise doctrine has no application in an
action by the injured participant in the enterprise against the driver of
the automobile. The reason for this is that the driver of an automobile
is always under a duty to exercise due care for the safety of his pas-
sengers.' 5 The position of the North Carolina court on this point was
not clearly stated until the recent decision of Rollison v. Hicks,10 in
which the court stated that the driver cannot invoke the doctrine of
joint enterprise as a defense in an action brought by his co-adventurer.
But apparently the negligence of the driver should be imputed to the
plaintiff in a suit against another passenger in the vehicle, all three of
them being engaged in a joint enterprise.17
The joint enterprise 'doctrine as applied to automobile accident cases
is based on an analogy with joint enterprises in business ventures, such
as partnerships. 18 There, all of the partners have a common interest,
the pooling of resources for the purpose of making a profit. One part-
ner can, by his negligence, bind his associates, and this is a sound rule
so far as business is concerned. The public is dealing with an organiza-
tion and has a right to be protected to the fullest extent. It is the
property aspect of the organization with which the doctrine is concerned.
However, in automobile accidents, the defendant is not deceived by
appearances, and he should not be permitted to escape liability merely
because the plaintiff and the driver were engaged in an activity for
mutual benefit and pleasure. The doctrine as applied to non-business
ventures has been criticized a good deal' 9 but it seems to be too thor-
oughly imbedded to be overruled by court decision.
It is often said that the 'doctrine is founded on the law of principal
tributory negligence of any other of them if the enterprise is so far joint that each
member of the group is responsible to third persons injured by the negligence of
a fellow member.
1 See collection of cases 65 C. J. S. p. 799 n. 38 (1950).
" Rollison v. Hicks, 233 N. C. 99, 63 S. E. 2d 190 (1951).
1" PaosszR, LAW OF TORTS, §65 (1941) : "Upon the analogy to the agency rule
that where two principals employ the same agent to deal with their common in-
terest, one cannot charge the other with misconduct of their mutual agent, unless
the other is personally at fault."
1865 C. J. S. NEGLIGENCE, §168 (1950).
"Gilmore v. Gross, 68 F. 2d 150, 153 (10th Cir. 1933) ; 4 BLASHFIELD, CYciLO-
PEDrA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW, §176 (1927); PROssER, LAW OF TORTS, §65 (1941);
Note, 12 N. C. L. Rv. 385 (1934).
"The doctrine of joint enterprise has, in rare instances, been applied in cases
dealing with other than automobile accidents and business ventures. One such
case is Cullinan v. Tetrault, 123 Me. 302, 122 AtI. 770 (1923), where the negli-
gence of one boy purchasing liquor for a drinking party was imputed to his com-
panion. Compare the refusal to apply the doctrine to pedestrians walking to-
gether, in Barnes v. Town of Marcus, 96 Iowa 675, 65 N. W. 984 (1896) . . .
With these few exceptions, all joint enterprise cases found have involved vehicles
or business ventures." PRossER, LAW OF ToRTs, p. 492, n. 26 (1941).
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and agent. 20 But it is hard to conceive that people engaged in a joint
enterprise for mutual pleasure consider themselves as agents of each
other. Another point which illustrates that the rule is a pure fiction,
with little if any basis in reality, is the fact that a member of a joint
enterprise is deemed by law to have a legal right to control the opera-
tion of the vehicle without having any actual control. A theoretical
right of control is thus a sufficient basis for imputing the negligence of
the driver to the passenger. Of course, if the passenger knows of ap-
proaching danger and fails to warn the driver, he himself may be liable
on the theory of actual negligence.21
One argument in favor of enforcing the joint enterprise rule is the
fact that the parties enter into the transaction or enterprise of their own
free will. Likewise they have the choice of withdrawing at their pleasure.
One striking point about the present case is the fact that the occupants
of the patrol car were fellow employees. They were working for a
common employer. The plaintiff had no choice in the selection of the
person with whom he would be associated during the patrol job. He
either had to ride with the man assigned with him or stand the risk of
losing his job. In view of this situation the court might have ruled that
an important element-the privilege of quitting the venture at will-
was lacking, and therefore it was not a true joint enterprise.22
ROBERT L. WHITMIRE, JR.
Negligence-Automobiles--Sudden Appearance Doctrine
In a recent action for the wrongful death of a child,' the North
Carolina Supreme Court applied, for the first time, the descriptive phrase
"sudden appearance" to a doctrine long recognized in automobile negli-
gence cases. 2 This doctrine is applied in those cases where a motorist
strikes a theretofore unseen child who darts in front of his automobile.
Such an accident is regarded as unavoidable, thereby relieving the mo-
torist of liability.3 Generally, North Carolina has applied this doctrine
to cases where the child has run from behind another vehicle or has
0 Albritton v. Hill, 190 N. C. 429, 130 S. E. 5 (1925); 1 VARTANIAN, THE
LAW OF AUTOmOBILES, §59 (1947).
" Central of Georgia R. R. v. Watkins, 37 F. 2d 710 (5th Cir. 1930).
2 For a case exactly in point, with the same result as the principal case, see
Collins v. Graves, 17 Cal. App. 2d 288, 61 P. 2d 1198 (1936).
' Register v. Gibbs, 233 N. C. 456, 64 S. E. 2d 280 (1951).
'In Butler v. Alien, 233 N. C. 484, 64 S. E. 2d 561 (1951), decided one week
later, this phrase appears in the headnote but not in the opinion. This phrase has
been used by other courts, however. Christian v. Smith, 78 Ga. App. 603, 51 S. E.
2d 857 (1949) ; Fultz' Adm'r. v. Williams, 266 Ky. 651, 99 S. W. 2d 803 (1936).
' See Notes, 113 A. L. R. 528, 536 (1938) ; 65 A. L. R. 192, 197 (1930). This
note does not deal with those cases involving the question of contributory negli-
gence on the part of the child. See generally, Note, 107 A. L. R. 5 (1937).
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broken away from the control of an adult.4
When the child has been visible for some distance, however, the
defendant is not relieved of liability, because such action should have
been anticipated. 5 This is true if the child was seen or could have been
seen by a proper lookout. The reasoning of the cases differs as to the
degree of care required. Some hold that more than ordinary care is
required. 6 Others only require ordinary care but recognize that the
vigilance of the operator varies with the age, physical condition, and
circumstances under which the child is seen. 7 Thus, the standard of
care remains the same, but the amount of diligence, attention, or effort
required varies. The expectation that children act heedlessly8 is merely
one circumstance to be considered. This, of course, means that "the
greater the danger, the greater the care which must be exercised."03
While a motorist may reasonably presume that an adult will remain in
a place of safety,' 0 the prevailing view today requires an assumption
that a child may move into danger."
'Fox v. Barlow, 206 N. C. 66, 173 S. E. 43 (1934); Kennedy v. Lookadoo,
203 N. C. 640, 166 S. E. 752 (1932) ; Fisher v. Deaton, 196 N. C. 461, 146 S. E.
66 (1928). But cf. Mills v. Moore, 219 N. C. 25, 12 S. E. 2d 661 (1940) (eighteen-
month-old whose presence in the road could not be explained was struck by de-
fendant's truck; nonsuit was allowed because it was highly speculative as to whether
defendant could have seen the child; four-to-three decision with vigorous dissent by
Justice Seawell.).
In Green v. Bowers, 230 N. C. 651, 55 S. E. 2d 651 (1949), and Bass v. Hocutt,
221 N. C. 218, 19 S. E. 2d 871 (1942), new trials were granted because of the failure
of the trial court to charge the jury concerning the possibility that the act of the
child was the proximate cause of the injury.
Butler v. Allen, 233 N. C. 484, 64 S. E. 2d 561 (1951) ; Register v. Gibbs,
233 N. C. 456, 64 S. E. 2d 280 (1951) ; Yokeley v. Kearns, 223 N. C. 196, 25 S. E.
2d 602 (1943); Caulder v. Motor Sales, Inc., 221 N. C. 437, 20 S. E. 2d 338
(1942) ; Smith v. Miller, 209 N. C. 170, 183 S. E. 370 (1935) ; Moore v. Powell,
205 N. C. 636, 172 S. E. 327 (1934); Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145 S. E.
169 (1928). But cf. Parks v. Willis, 228 N. C. 25, 44 S. E. 2d 343 (1947) (non-
suit reversed where six-year-old evidently ran out from a garage across street and
fell under the rear wheels of a truck which had turned to avoid hitting her; the
truck was exceeding the speed limit by five miles per hour) ; Hughes v. Thayer,
229 N. C. 773, 51 S. E. 2d 488 (1949) (two children alighted from a school bus;
one ran across safely in front of the bus, but the other, an eight-year-old, waited
for the bus and two cars following to pass, then ran across the road in front of
defendant's car approaching from the other direction.).
'Yokeley v. Kearns, supra note 5; Kelly v. Hunsucker, 211 N. C. 153, 189
S. E. 664 (1936) ; Smith v. Miller, siepra note 5; Fox v. Barlow, 206 N. C. 66,
173 S. E. 43 (1934) ; Moore v. Powell, supra note 5; Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C.
213. 145 S. E. 169 (1928) ; State v. Gray, 180 N. C. 697, 104 S. E. 647 (1920). '
'In Rea v. Simowitz, 225 N. C. 575, 35 S. E. 2d 871 (1945), Justice Barnhill
attempted to clarify the misconception that a higher standard of care is required,
stating that there are no degrees of care in fixing responsibility for negligence.
The motorist is only held to the standard of care which a prudent man would have
used under the circumstances.
'Hughes v. Thayer, 229 N. C. 773, 51 S. E. 2d 488 (1949) ; Yokeley v. Kearns,
223 N. C. 196, 25 S. E. 2d 602 (1943) ; Smith v. Miller, 209 N. C. 170, 183 S. E.
370 (1935); Fox v. Barlow, 206 N. C. 66, 173 S. E. 43 (1934).
9 REST.ATEmENT, TORTS, §298 (1947).
"o Fox v. Barlow, 206 N. C. 66, 173 S. E. 43 (1934) ; Bryan v. Fewell, 191 Va.
647, 62 S. E. 2d 39 (1950).
" Webster v. Luckow, 219 Iowa 1048, 258 N. W. 685 (1935); Hughes v.
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Another situation where the doctrine of "sudden appearance" is
inapplicable is where the driver has been guilty of some negligent act
which made it impossible to see the child or to avoid the accident after
seeing the child. 12 So, where a child darts out from beside the road,
and the driver is going at such an excessive rate of speed that he is
unable to stop before striking the child, he cannot escape liability under
this doctrine. 13
Whether the driver saw, or could have seen, the child in time to
avoid a collision, and whether, once seen, he exercised the care of a
reasonable, prudent man to avoid a collision, is always a question of
fact. But once it is established that the child was or should have been
seen, the doctrine of "sudden appearance" becomes inapplicable, and the




Defendant's train was blocking a city street for longer than five
minutes, in violation of a municipal ordinance, when plaintiff attempted
to climb between the cars in order to return to his place of employment.
The train was suddenly moved without signal injuring plaintiff. The dis-
trict court excluded evidence of a long standing custom for persons to
climb between railroads cars which blocked the crossing, and dismissed
on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. In
Stratton v. Southern Ry.,' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Thayer, 229 N. C. 773, 51 S. E. 2d 488 (1949) ; Price v. Burton, 155 Va. 229, 154
S. E. 499 (1930).
But see Brown v. Wade, 145 So. 790 (La. App. 1933), where the court stated
that a driver could assume that a child would stay on an urban sidewalk, but could
not so assume as to a child on a county road; Faatz v. Sullivan, 199 Iowa 875,
200 N. W. 321 (1924), where a boy was struck by defendant after he had passed
pathway of car when he retraced his steps, the Supreme Court held the jury
should have been told that driver of automobile had right to assume that the boy
having reached a place of safety would either remain there or continue on hisjourney; Moeller v. Packard, 86 Cal. App. 459, 261 Pac. 135 (1927) ; Hutcheson
v. Misenheimer, 169 Va. 511, 194 S. E. 665 (1938).
" Butler v. Allen, 233 N. C. 484, 64 S. E. 2d 561 (1951) ; Kelly v. Hunsucker,
211 N. C. 153, 189 S. E. 664 (1936) ; Goss v. Williams, 196 N. C. 213, 145 S. E.
169 (1928) ; Harper v. Crislip, 103 Va. 514, 138 S. E. 93 (1927).
2 Butler v. Allen, 233 N. C. 484, 487, 64 S. E. 2d 561, 563 (1951), ... where
one is driving an automobile at a speed in excess of the statutory limit, or at a
greater speed than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing,
the mere fact that a child suddenly runs in front of the moving vehicle, does not
necessarily relieve the driver from liability. There still remains the question
whether the negligent driving of the automobile made it impossible for the driver
of the car, under the circumstances, to avoid the accident after seeing the child,
or whether by the exercise of reasonable care, such driver could have seen the
child in time to avoid the injury."
"' See note 3 supra.
' 190 F. 2d 917 (4th Cir. 1951).
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reversed, holding that under North Carolina law the evidence of custom
should have been admitted, and that the negligence of defendant and
contributory negligence of plaintiff were questions for the jury.2
It is well settled in North Carolina that violation of a municipal
ordinance is negligence per se. 3 However, such violation, in order to
be actionable, must be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.4 Absent
contributory negligence as a matter of law, the question of defendant's
negligence is submitted to the jury if the violation of the ordinance can
reasonably be found to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.5
The North Carolina Supreme Court makes no mention of the general
rule requiring plaintiff to be a member of a class for whose benefit the
ordinance was enacted, or requiring the injury to be of a type which
the ordinance was designed to prevent.0 It is likely that the court
considers these items of statutory construction under its broad treatment
of proximate cause.
The general rule in North Carolina is that evidence as to custom is
admissible. 7 Where such evidence can be shown to impose a duty or
- In Texas & New Orleans R. R. v. Owens, 54 S. W. 2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932), under exactly the same fact situation, it was held that evidence of custom
was properly admitted for the determination of the jury in deciding both de-
fendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence since the custom of
long standing imposed upon defendant the duty to be on the lookout for such per-
sons and to use due care to avoid injury to them.
'Hendrix v. Southern Ry., 198 N. C. 142, 150 S. E. 873 (1929); Dickey v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 196 N. C. 726, 147 S. E. 15 (1929) ; Cherry v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R., 186 N. C. 263, 119 S. E. 361 (1923) ; Newton v. Texas Co., 180
N. C. 561, 105 S. E. 433 (1920); Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C. 125, 81 S. E.
1066 (1914).
'Arnold v. Owens, 78 F. 2d 495 (4th Cir. 1935); Holderfield v. Rummage
Bros., 232 N. C. 623, 61 S. E. 2d 904 (1950) ; White v. North Carolina R. R., 216
N. C. 79, 3 S. E. 2d 310 (1939) ; Hendrix v. Southern Ry., 198 N. C. 142, 150
S. E. 873 (1929).
"When more than one inference may be drawn, proximate cause is a question
for the jury. But where there is no dispute as to the facts, and such facts are not
reasonably capable of more than one inference, it is the duty of the judge to in-
struct, as a matter of law, whether the injury was the proximate result of the
negligence of defendant." Note, 7 N. C. L. REv. 482 (1929).
'Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Hauser, 211 Fed. 567 (4th Cir. 1913) ; Boles v. Heg-
ler, 232 N. C. 327, 59 S. E. 2d 796 (1950) ; Humphries v. Queen City Coach Co., 228
N. C. 399, 45 S. E. 2d 546 (1947) ; Rea v. Simowitz, 225 N. C. 575, 35 S. E. 2d
871 (1945) ; Anderson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 161 N. C. 462, 77 S. E. 402
(1911). See cases cited in note 4 supra.
'PRossER, ToRTs 274 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §286 (1934); Notes, 15
BROOKLYN L. REv. 246 (1946); 37 Ky. L. J. 358 (1949); 7 N. C. L. REv. 482
(1929).
' Custom for railroad tracks to be used by pedestrians as walkway, Powers v.
Norfolk Southern R. R., 166 N. C. 599, 82 S. E. 972 (1914), Thompson v. Aber-
deen & A. R. R., 149 N. C. 155, 62 S. E. 883 (1908), McCall v. Southern Ry, 129
N. C. 298, 40 S. E. 67 (1901) ; Beck v. Southern Ry., 146 N. C. 455, 59 S. E. 1015
(1907) (custom of employees to cross between railroad cars standing on yard);
Ray v. Aberdeen & R. R.R., 141 N. C. 84, 53 S. E. 622 (1906) (persons accustomed
to stand or move about in railroad yard) ; Bradley v. Ohio River & C. Ry., 126
N. C. 735, 36 S. E. 181 (1900) (custom of defendant never to back train over
crossing after passing it) ; Hamilton v. Southern Ry., 200 N. C. 543, 158 S. E.
75, cert. denied, 284 U. S. 636 (1931) (custom of making light repairs to freight
cars on "exchange tracks") ; McClellan v. North Carolina R.R., 155 N. C. 1, 70
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obligation upon defendant, it is a factor in determining defendant's
negligence in an alleged breach or omission of such duty.8 . Since per-
sons at public railroad crossings are not trespassers, 9 the railroad owes
more than a duty not to willfully or wantonly injure them; it must ex-
ercise due care for their safety.10
Assuming that in the Stratton case plaintiff was negligent in climb-
ing between the cars, it seems that the doctrine of last clear chance1
might have been applied since defendant, in view of the long standing
custom, owed a duty to warn plaintiff before starting the train. In
North Carolina, it is not essential that defendant have actual knowledge
of the danger to plaintiff, if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the peril
could have been discovered. 12
EDWIN B. HATCH, JR.
Parole-Gain Time Credits Forfeited Upon Revocation
In a recent habeas corpus proceeding in Florida, the petitioner sought
release from confinement on the theory that his sentence had expired.
At an earlier date he had been released on parole, and upon violation of
the conditions of his parole he had been returned to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence. He now contended that his sentence
had been served, by computing for credit, in addition to the time actually
served in prison, (1) the period he was at large on parole, and (2)
gain time for good conduct granted prior to date of parole. Held, in
reversing the trial court which granted the petition, neither the time
spent on parole nor the gain time for good conduct granted prior to
parole serve to reduce the time imposed by the original sentence.'
S. E. 1066, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 988 (1911) (custom of sounding gong as warning
to persons between gates on railroad track before lowering gates).
Cf. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Carolina Peanut Co., 186 F. 2d 816 (4th
Cir. 1950), where evidence of custom was held for determination of the jury only
where there is other evidence from which jury could properly conclude that de-
fendant used ordinary care.
'Hamilton v. Southern Ry., 200 N. C. 543, 158 S. E. 75, cert. denied, 284 U. S.
636 (1931) ; STAxSBURY, NORTH: CAROLINA EviDmNc- §95 (1946).
'"Where a railroad track crosses a public highway, both a traveler and the
railroad have equal rights to cross. . . ." Johnson v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 163
N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690 (1913). Missouri ex rel. Bush v. Sturgis, 281 Mo. 598,
221 S. W. 91 (1920).
10 Johnson v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 163 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 690 (1913). "A
railroad company which blocks a crossing .. . for a longer time than the law
permits has been held to become itself a trespasser, and to be estopped to say that
one who attempts to climb over its cars is a trespasser... ." 44 Am. JUR. 743-744(1942).1 Bogan v. Carolina Central R. R., 129 N. C. 154, 39 S. E. 808 (1901).
" Mount Olive Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 233 N. C. 661, 65 S. E.
2d 379 (1951); Aydlett v. Keim, 232 N. C. 367, 61 S. E. 2d 109 (1950); Ingram
v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N. C. 444, 35 S. E. 2d 337 (1945); West
Coust. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 185 N. C. 43, 116 S. E. 3 (1923) ; Ray v.
Aberdeen & R. R. R., 141 N. C. 84, 53 S. E. 622 (1906).
'Mayo v. Lukers, 53 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1951).
1952]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A Florida statute specifically provided that in event of revocation
of parole, time spent at large on parole "would in no manner decrease
or diminish the time imposed by the original sentence. ' 2 Hence, the
ruling of the court on this point seems clearly correct. However, there
was no express statutory provision dealing with the status of gain time
for good conduct earned prior to parole. The court cited a statute pro-
viding for forfeiture of gain time credits in the case of certain serious
misconduct of those actually in prison,3 but the statute clearly was not
applicable, as was apparently recognized, to misconduct of parolees.
However, it was reasoned from this statute that since the gain time
allowance may be forfeited by misconduct during the life of the sentence,
that "the time allowance is an act of grace rather than a vested right
which may be withdrawn, modified or denied. ... "4 Hence, the ad-
ministrative agency (the Florida Paroles Commission) had the authority
to disallow these previously earned credits upon revocation of parole.
An earlier Florida case, not cited in the principal case, had reached the
same result. 5 However, in neither of these cases did the court expressly
deal with what seems to be an important question; i.e., should an ad-
ministrative agency have the authority in the absence of an express
legislative grant to disallow gain time credits previously earned, upon
revocation of parole? Although the granting of gain time credits may
be labelled an "act of grace," it is nevertheless an act of legislative grace.
It could thus be reasoned that the Florida legislature had apparently
intended that a prisoner should be deprived of that "grace" only when
authorized by express statutory provision. On this basis, it would seem
that the decision of the Florida court upholding the "administrative for-
feiture" of gain time credits is not well-founded. 6
Parole statutes may be generally classified into three categories:
First, those that expressly provide that upon revocation of parole, all
gain time credits shall be forfeited.' Second, those that provide, in
'FLA. STAT. ANN. §947.21 (1940). The similar statute in North Carolina is
N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-61.1 (Supp. 1951).
'FLA. STAT. ANN. §954.04 (1940). This statute provides that all commuta-
tions which shall have accrued in favor of the prisoner shall be forfeited for each
sustained charge of escape or attempted escape, mutinous conduct or other serious
misconduct.
"Mayo v. Lukers, 53 So. 2d 916,917 (Fla. 1951).
'Dear v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 164, 14 So. 2d 267 (1943).
'Apparently the court is of the opinion that a result is automatically derived
by placing a label on the gain time credits. Whether gain time credits are, or
are not, "vested rights," is irrelevant. If the test of "vested" is "the certainty of
the future right of enjoyment," clearly they are not "vested rights" for a statute
specifically provides for forfeiture under certain circumstances. Even if they
could be labelled vested rights," they may be divested by legislative authority, as
indicated by statutes, note 7 infra. Therefore, the Florida court would not seem
to be justified in concluding that the gain time credits may be disallowed simply
because they are not "vested rights," but instead are "acts of grace."
' COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48 §§549, 557 (1935) ; DEL. REv. CODE c. 101, 4155 §38
(1935) ; LA. REv. STAT. §15:574.9 (West 1950) ; ME. REV. STAT. C. 136 §22 (1944);
OKL.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 §332.14 (1949); Wis. STAT. §57.11 (3) (1947).
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effect, that forfeiture of gain time credits shall lie in the discretion of
the administrative agency responsible for parole matters.8 Third, those
statutes which do not expressly deal with the status of gain time credits
upon revocation of parole.9
Jurisdictions in the third category are split as to the status of gain
time credits on revocation of parole. Where one statute provided that
upon revocation of parole the prisoner may be required to "serve in
prison the whole or any part of the maximum period for which at the
time of his release, he was subject to imprisonment under his sentence
... -,10 it was held that emphasis was to be placed on the words, "at
the time of his release" 11 on parole; i.e., that the exact status of his
8CAL. GEN. STAT. c. 429 §883 (1949); N. Y. CORRECTION LAW §218; UTAIH
CODE ANN. §85-9-78 (1943) ; 18 U. S. C. §4165 (1948). Courts would not review
the action of the particular agency unless it clearly appears that it has exceeded its
powers or that substantial injustice has been done. See People ex rel. Thread-
craft v. Brophy, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 75, 255 App. Div. 823 (1938) ; Ex Parte Taylor,
216 Cal. 274, 13 P. 2d 906 (1932). But cf. People ex rel. Fershing v. Wilson, 20
N. Y. S. 2d 895, 174 Misc. 191 (Sup. Ct. 1939), reversed, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 897,
259 App. Div. 957 (3d Dep't 1939). Federal courts construe 18 U. S. C. §4165,
which provides for discretionary forfeiture of gain time for good conduct for vio-
lation of the rules of the institution, as being applicable to forfeiture upon revoca-
tion of parole. Such construction rests on the theory that while on parole a parolee
is "still in contemplation of law a prisoner, his parole privilege being merely an
extension of the prison walls. Jarman v. U. S., 92 F. 2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1937).
Federal cases seem to indicate that forfeiture is an almost automatic procedure
upon revocation of parole. See Hedrick v. Steele, 187 F. 2d 261 (8th Cir. 1951) ;
Taylor v. Squier, 142 F. 2d 737 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Sanford v. Runyon, 136 F. 2d 54(5th Cir. 1943) ; Christianson v. Zerbst, 89 F. 2d 40 (10th Cir. 1937) ; Phipps v.
Pescor, 68 F. Supp. 242 (W. D. Mo. 1946). WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. §10249-4
(Supp. 1940) allows the discretionary imposition, as a condition of parole, that
credits shall be forfeited upon violation of parole.
' Some provide that the prisoner shall be remanded and confined for the unex-
pired term of his sentence, which is calculated from the date of delinquency: ALA.
CODE ANN. tit. 42 §12 (1940) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38 §808 (1949) ; IND. STAT.
ANN. §13-249, et seq. (Burns 1933) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 127 §149 (1949) ; MIcH.
STAT. ANN. §28.1316 (1938); N. M. STAT. ANN. §42-1709 (1941); OHio GEN.
CODE ANN. §2209-20 (Supp. 1950) (however, parolee may be re-paroled on dif-
ferent conditions, or sent to another institution); TENN. CODE ANN. §11843.12
(Supp. 1951). Others provide that the prisoner shall be 'remanded and confined
for the unexpired term of his sentence, which is calculated from the date of re-
lease on parole: ARiz. CODE ANN. §47-116 (1939); FLA. STAT. ANN. §947.21
(1940); GA. CODE ANN. §77-505 (1937) (discretionary whether time on parole
shall be included as part of the original sentence) ; MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAwS art.
41, §84 (1939) (discretionary whether time on parole shall be included as part of
the original sentence); Mo. REv. STAT. §§4202, 9160 (1939); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§148.61.1 (Supp. 1951); N. H. Ray. LAWS c. 429, §36 (1942); N. J. STAT. ANN.
§2:198-4 (1939); ORE. Comp. LAws ANN. §26-2308 (1940); R. I. GEN. LAWS c.
38, §5 (1938); VT. STAT. REV. §8045 (1947); W. VA. CODE ANN. §6291 (26)
(1949). Some, however, remain silent as to the date from which calculated, or as
to the status of his sentence upon revocation of parole: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§43-
2803-2808 (1947); Ky. REv. STAT. §439.190 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. §637.06;
MISS. CODE ANN. §2543 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 94-9819 (1947); NEB.
REV. STAT. §29-2628 (1943); NEV. Comp. LAwS ANN. 11579 (Supp. 1949); N. D.
REv. CODE §12-5525 (1943); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61 §298 (1930); S. C. CODE
ANN. §1038-11 (Supp. 1948) ; S. D. CODE §13.5307 (1939) ; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 781b §19 (1950); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §11-406 (1945).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. §6291 (26) (1949).
'Watts v. Skeen, 54 S. E. 2d 563, 566 (W. Va. 1949).
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sentence was to be determined as of the time of his release on parole.
"In the absence of statutory authorization," the court continued, "the
revocation of a parole does not operate as a forfeiture of any 'good time'
earned prior to the granting of the parole .... ,12 Others, in refusing
to forfeit the gain time, hold that statutes or rules providing for gain
time are to be read into the judgment and form a part thereof ;18 that
the '"dimunition of imprisonment provided for by statute is a privilege
of which the prisoner can be deprived only in accordance with the pro-
visions of the statute,"' 4 and if no provision is made for forfeiture upon
violation of parole, then the prisoner stands entitled to the time.'5 On
the other hand, courts have casually disallowed the gain time for good
conduct upon revocation of parole,' 6 or have held that the statutory
provisions allowing gain time for good conduct "cannot enter into the
sentence or form a part of it, for the reward must first be earned before
the prisoner is entitled to it."'' I The theory is that continued good
conduct is a condition precedent to the prisoner's rights to any credits,
and that the condition is not satisfied by misconduct on parole.
The relative dearth of decisions on this point in jurisdictions in the
third category would seem to be indicative at least of a policy to allow
a parolee to retain his gain time credits upon revocation of parole. An
overwhelming majority of the states do not have statutes expressly
dealing with the problem, and a majority of these states that have ruled
on the point have held that the prisoner stands entitled to the time upon
revocation of parole. Therefore, it would seem in line with the weight
of authority that in the absence of express statutory authorization there
should be no forfeiture of the credits upon revocation of parole.
In North Carolina the question has never been before the court.18
2lIbid.
Woodward v. Murdock, 124 Ind. 439, 24 N. E. 1047 (1890). Indiana adopted
its present statute in 1897, hence subsequent to the above decision. See note 9
supra. Apparently, however, a parolee is still allowed to retain his gain time upon
revocation of parole. See Boyd v. Howard 224 Ind. 439, 68 N. E. 2d 652 (1946).
" State ex rel. Davis v. Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 571, 100 N. W. 510, 512 (1904).
Iowa's present statute, IOwA CODE ANN. §247.28 (1950), is unusual in that it pro-
vides that one violating a condition of parole shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and shall be imprisoned to serve five years, upon the completion of the previous
sentence.
6 Ibid. See also Ex Parte McKenna, 79 Vt. 34, 64 Atl. 77 (1906).
'"Ex Parte Holton, 304 Mich. 534, 8 N. W. 2d 628 (1943).
" Stephens v. Conley, 48 Mont. 352, 355, 138 Pac. 189, 192 (1914).
8 State v. Yates, 183 N. C. 753, 11 S. E. 337 (1927). The facts in this case
indicate that the order of revocation from the governor stated that "no time [shall
be] allowed for previous good behavior, if any such time was entered to his
credit." The point was not raised, the issue being the authority to revoke a parole
after the time fixed in the original sentence had expired. It is doubtful that any
gain time had been granted; he had been paroled after serving only 42 days. How-
ever, it has been held in other jurisdictions that a provision in an order of revoca-
tion for forfeiture of gain time for good conduct is illegal and outside the authority
of the governor. See State ex rel. Davis v. Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 100 N. W. 510(1904). See also, Ex parte Ridley, 3 Okl. Cr. 350, 106 Pac. 549 (1910). Since
the Ridley case Oklahoma has amended its statute to provide for automatic cancella-
tion of gain time credits upon revocation of parole.
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While a prisoner in North Carolina may earn gain time credits for good
conduct,' 9 there is no express provision for forfeiture of this time except
by escape or attempted escape, 20 or participation in mutiny, riot, insur-
rection, destruction of state property, or attack upon any officer or
inmate.21 North Carolina, being in the third category, is therefore
similar to most jurisdictions in that the statute remains silent as to the
status of gain time credits upon revocation of parole.
It has been the administrative policy in North Carolina to allow an
ex-parolee to retain his acquired gain time credits, and this policy is
founded on the belief that the administrative agency is without authority,
under the present statutes, to deprive him of that time.22 In the light
of what has been said before, this view seems entirely proper from both
a legal and a policy standpoint.
ROGER B. HENDRIX.
Sales-Implied Warranty of Wholesomeness-Requirement of Privity
A wrongful death action was brought in North Carolina against a
retail druggist for breach of an implied warranty of wholesomeness of
a salt substitute, sold in its original package to plaintiff's intestate. The
defendant retailer joined his wholesaler as third-party defendant, on the
allegation that the wholesaler was primarily liable on the same implied
warranty. The wholesaler demurred for failure to state a cause of
action and for misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The over-
ruling of the demurrer was affirmed and the joinder held proper be-
cause the retailer, if held liable, would be able to recover the loss from
the wholesaler. 1
Most jurisdictions recognize the implied warranty of fitness for
human consumption in the sale of food.2 A majority of jurisdictions,
" Rules and Regulations Governing the Management of Prisoners under the
Control of the State Highway and Public Works Commission. §2 (1949), as au-
thorized by N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-12, 13 (1943). Time earned is dependent on the
grade of the prisoner. Additional time may be earned if the prisoner is of a cer-
tain grade and on continuous good behavior for twelve months; credit may also
be earned for Sunday, holiday or emergency work.20 N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-41 (1943).2 1Rules, op. cit. supra note 19, §6(o).
" Informal opinion, State Highway and Public Works Commission. But see
note 18 supra.
'-Davis v. Radford, 233 N. C. 283, 63 S. E. 2d 822 (1951).
Under the common law: Stanfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 117, 53
P. 2d 878 (1936) ; Degouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100
S.W. 2d 336 (1936) ; Walker v. Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S. E. 2d 668 (1941) ;
Williams v. Elson, 218 N. C. 157, 10 S. E. 2d 668 (1940); Rabb v. Covington, 215
N. C. 572, 2 S. E. 2d 705 (1939) ; Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609,
164 S. W. 2d 828 (1942) ; Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186 S. E.
94 (1936); Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market, 121 W. Va. 605, 5 S. E. 2d 785
(1939) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES §242 (Rev. ed. 1948). The Uniform Sales Act has
been adopted in 34 states. See 1 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, SALES, p. XV, (1950),
Table III, for a list of the states which have adopted it, the dates of adoption, and
the respective state statutes. The implied warranty of fitness under the Uniform
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including North Carolina, require privity between the parties for a re-
covery for its breach.3 This limitation rests on the ground that the
warranty is contractual in its nature; therefore any party to an action
for its breach must also have been a party to the sale contract. 4 Thus,
the privity rule imposes two limitations: (1) It prevents a person who
is not the purchaser of the deleterious food from recovering for a breach
of the implied warranty of fitness, and (2) it prevents an injured pur-
chaser from maintaining a breach of warranty action against any but
his immediate vendor.5 However, a vendor against whom a judgment
Sales Act is found in Section 15 (1) : "Where the buyer, expressly or by implica-
tion, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are
required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose." Making known the pur-
pose and reliance on the seller's skill are both required under the common law
and the Uniform Sales Act. The courts have generally been lenient in finding
both requirements in food cases. A purchaser of food is recognized as wanting the
food to eat, and the mere fact of purchase has been regarded as giving rise to a
presumption of reliance or as being sufficient evidence of reliance. See 1 WLLIs-
TON, SALES §242 (Rev. ed. 1948) ; DIcKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD
CONSUMER, 32, 44-48 (1951).
Consideration of the liability of the restaurateur is excluded from this note.
The weight of authority holds him liable for breach of implied warranty. See
DICKERSON, PRoDUcTs LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONsUMER, 159-180 (1951) ; Was-
serman, Commentary on Dinrs' Protection, 61 N. J. L. J. 57 (1938) ; Note, 14
NOTRE DAME Law. 318 (1939).
'E.g., Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A. 2d 224 (1938);
Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, .31 A. 2d 316 (1943); Newhall v. Ward
Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N. E. 625 (1922); Hazelton v. First National
Stores, 88 N. H. 409, 190 Ati. 280 (1937); Stave v. Giant Food Arcade, 125
N. J. L. 512, 16 A. 2d 460 (1940); Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 App.
Div. 278, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 788 (1943); Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208
N. C. 1, 179 S. E. 30 (1935); Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co., 166 Va. 314, 186
S. E. 94 (1936); Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N. W. 905 (1927); 1
WILLTON, SALES §244 (Rev. ed. 1948).
'The action of express warranty originally sounded in tort. In Stuart v.
Wilkins, 1 Dougl. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (1778), Lord Mansfield held that the proper
action was one in assumpsit. When implied warranties came to be recognized, the
action of assumpsit was accepted as correct. See DICKERSON, PRoDucTs LIABILITY
AND THE FOOD CONsumER, 34-37 (1951); 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§195-197 (Rev.
ed. 1948).
' See note 3 supra.
Some states will not allow suit for breach of the implied warranty of fitness
against the retailer of deleterious food sold by him in its original sealed container.
The theory is that the retailer can have no greater knowledge of possible defects
than the buyer, and since the buyer knows it, there can be no reliance on the
retailer's skill in selection. Common law states: Davis v. Williams, 58 Ga. App.
274, 198 S. E. 357 (1938) ; Kroger Grocery Co. v. Llewelling, 165 Miss. 71. 145
So. 726 (1933) ; Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S. E.
610 (1936). Uniform Sales Act states: Kirkland v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 233 Ala. 404. 171 So. 735 (1937): Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Swilling, 186
Ark. 1149, 57 S. W. 2d 1029 (1933); Bigelow v. Maine Central R. R., 110 Me.
105, 85 Atl. 396 (1912) ; Wilkes v. Memphis Grocery Co., 23 Tenn. App. 550, 134
S. W. 2d 929 (1939). Quite a few states have expressly repudiated this doctrine
under both the common law and the Uniform Sales Act, and it does not appear
to be gaining in popularity. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl.
385 (1932); Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E.
225 (1918) : Griffin v. James Butler Grocery Co., 108 N. J. L. 92, 156 Atl. 636
(1931) ; Rabb v. Covington, 215 N. C. 572, 2 S. E. 2d 705 (1939) ; Bonenberger
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has been obtained by an injured consumer or intermediate vendee may
generally recover over against his vendor on the same warranty until
the party ultimately responsible for the breach is held liable in damages.6
Where there is an express warranty by the manufacturer on the outside
of the package, North Carolina allows the injured purchaser to sue
directly for a breach, free of the privity requirement. 7
The joinder of the wholesaler in the principal case has the practical
effect of avoiding the immediate vendor-vendee limitation of the privity
rule.8 Since there was no allegation of a separate breach of the war-
ranty by the retailer, he could recover over from the wholesaler the
amount of his liability in the same action.9 However, this effect is
limited by the fact that the defendant and not the plaintiff had control
of the joinder. But practically, a defendant would hardly resist joining
his vendor if he could thereby escape liability. In addition to any doubt
that might be cast upon the validity of the requirement of privity by this
decision, there was a dictum in the opinion that: "Under the decision in
Simpson v. Oil Co.1o . . . it would seem that the plaintiff here [con-
sumer] could have maintained an action against . . . the distributor for
v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A. 2d 913 (1942). A debate on the
question of imposing absolute liability on the retailer is found in the following:
Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 Mica. L. REv. 494
(1936) ; Brown, The liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products, 23
MINN. L. Rav. 585 (1939); Waite, Retail Responsibility-A Reply, 23 MINN. L.
REv. 612 (1939).
'Royal Paper Box Co. v. Munro & Church Co., 284 Mass. 446, 188 N. E. 223
(1933); Carleton v. Lombard, 19 App. Div. 297, 46 N. Y. Supp. 120 (1897);
Aldridge Motor Co. v. Alexander, 217 N. C. 750, 9 S. E. 2d 469 (1940) ; Williams
v. Chevrolet Co., 209 N. C. 29, 182 S. E. 719 (1935) ; Wolstenholme v. Randall &
Bro., Inc., 295 Pa. 131, 144 AtI. 909 (1929) ; 3 WILLISTON, SALES §614a (Rev. ed.
1948); 22 Am. Jut., Food §110 (1938).
Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N. C. 542, 8 S. E. 2d 813 (1940). Here
plaintiff-purchaser suffered violent skin irritations from the use of an insecticide,
the package of which carried the words, ". . . non-poisonous to human beings, but
... not suited for internal use." The court stated, "We know of no reason why
the original manufacturer and distributor should not, for his own benefit and that,
of course, of the ultimate consumer, make such assurances, nor -why they should
not be relied upon in good faith, nor why they should not constitute a warranty
on the part of the original seller and distributor running with the product into the
hands of the consumer, for whom it was intended." But cf. Pelletier v. Dupont,
124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925), where the court failed to find an express war-
tanty as to the wholesomeness of bread from the words on the label, "Purity Nu-
trition Cleanliness absolutely applies to Edgeworth Bread.", and also stated that
there must be privity between the parties for an action on express warranty. Also
see Alpine v. Friend Bros., Inc., 244 Mass. 164, 138 N. E. 553 (1923) and New-
hall v. Ward Baking Co., 240 Mass. 434, 134 N. E. 625 (1922), where the actions
were for deceit rather than for breach of express warranty.
" See note 6 supra.
8 The following cases allowed similar joinders: Occhipinti v. Buscemi, 267
App. Div. 874, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 292 (1944); Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen,
169 Misc. 879, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 110 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1939) ; Weiner v. Mager &
Throne, 167 Misc. 338, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 918 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1938) ; McSpedon v.
Kunz, 271 N. Y. 131, 2 N. E. 2d 513 (1936) ; Barker v. Weingarten Riverside Co.,
232 S. W. 2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
10 Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N. C. 542, 8 S. E. 2d 813 (1940) (foot-
note ours).
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the cause set out in his complaint, though he has elected to sue only
the retail dealer."'" The case here relied upon is distinguishable from
the principal case, since it involved an express warranty by the manu-
facturer to the consumer through the medium of the product's package,
rather than an implied warranty. 12 Nevertheless, such language may
indicate a feeling that the privity limitation is no longer proper as a
matter of policy.13
Recent decisions in other jurisdictions have allowed recovery by
the ultimate consumer where no contractual relationship existed between
the parties. This may indicate a general trend toward the elimination
of the requirement of privity in sale-of-food actions. Various theories
have been advanced to sustain this result. Some cases have avoided the
result of the privity requirement where the purchaser and the consumer
are different, but related, parties by holding that the right to sue a
retailer is actually based on an agency-principal relationship between the
plaintiff-consumer and the purchaser. 14 Others, recognizing the re-
quirement of privity, have found that the implied warranty runs with
the goods so that ownership is the basis of recovery,15 or that the con-
sumer is a third party beneficiary of the contract between the manu-
facturer and the retailer and as such can sue.16 A third class of cases
allows recovery by doing away with the requirement of privity on the
specific ground of public policy' 7 or upon general policy considerations. 18
"Davis v. Radford, 233 N. C. 283, 286, 63 S. E. 2d 822, 825 (1951).
12 See note 7 supra.
"For certain policy considerations, see Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co.,
208 N. C. 1, 5, 179 S. E. 30, 32 (1935) (dissenting opinion) ; Condon, The Practi-
cal Impact of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code oi) Food Poisoning Cases,
5 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L. J. 213 (1950) ; Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to
Persons Other Thai; Their Inmediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. Rav. 134 (1937);
Perkins, Untwholesome Food as a Source of Liability, 5 IowA L. BULL. 86 (1920) ;
Note, 7 WAsH. L. REv. 351 (1932).
"Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N. E. 2d 739 (1943);
Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A. 2d 316 (1943) ; Colby v. First National
Stores, 307 Mass. 252, 29 N. E. 2d 920 (1940) ; Wadleigh v. Howson, 88 N. H.
365, 189 AUt. 865 (1937) ; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y. 388, 175
N. E. 105 (1931).
"E.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927)
(donee of purchaser allowed to sue) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith, 97 S. W.
2d 761, 767 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (suit by injured purchaser against the manu-
facturer of a bottled coca-cola: ". . . the defendant's implied warranty to the
retailer who purchased from it with knowledge and intention on the part of the
defendant that the beverage would be sold and consumed by a purchaser from the
retailer ran with the article and inured to the benefit of the plaintiff who pur-
chased from the dealer.").
"Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P. 2d 833 (1938);
Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 478, 161 N. E. 557, 559 (1928)
(Suit by injured consumer against manufacturer of cake containing needle which
was purchased from retail groceryman: "Whatever implied warranty arises in
favor of the groceryman, who established the contractual relationship with the
Baking Company, is for the benefit of this third party, namely, the ultimate con-
sumer.").
"7E.g., Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944);
Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N. E. 2d 162 (1947) ;
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One court interpreted the Uniform Sales Act as expressing legislative
intent to do away with the privity limitation. 19
An injured purchaser of deleterious food in its original package may
generally bring a negligence action directly against the manufacturer,
privity not being required.20 He is aided in many jurisdictions by the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,2 1 or the principle that
the violation of pure food and drug acts by the manufacture of unwhole-
some food constitutes negligence per se.22 But in North Carolina, if
the plaintiff is unable to show actual negligence, the only other way
that he may prove his cause of action is by evidence that products manu-
factured under substantially similar conditions, and sold by the de-
fendant "about the same time," contained foreign or deleterious sub-
Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N. E. 2d 739 (1943) ; Davis v.
Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920) ; Helms v. General
Baking Co., 164 S. W. 2d 150 (Mo. App. 1942); Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S. W. 2d 445 (1936) ; Sincavage v. Armour
& Co., 41 Luz. Leg. Reg. 183 (Pa. C. P. 1950); Amarillo Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Loudder, 207 S. W. 2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Jacob E. Decker & Sons
v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S. W. 2d 828 (1942) ; Nelson v. West Coast Dairy
Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105 P. 2d 76 (1940); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash.
622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
,'Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. 2d 930
(1938) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 So. 217 (1934) ; Rain-
water v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95 So. 444 (1923);
Griffin v. Asbury, 196 Okla. 484, 165 P. 2d 822 (1945).
Louisiana does not require privity under the civil law. Arndt v. D. H. Holmes
Co., 9 La. App. 36, 119 So. 91 (1928) ; Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, 129 La. 838,
56 So. 906 (1911); DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE Fooo CONSUMER,
65, n. 3 (1951).
It seems that Montana has reached the same result. Bolitho v. Safeway Stores,
109 Mont. 213, 95 P. 2d 443 (1939) (recovery on implied warranty theory by
daughter of purchaser).
"
0 Klein v. Dutchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 279, 93 P. 2d 799, 804
(1939). The California statute is identical with Section 15(1) of the Uniform
Sales Act. The opinion stated, "In adopting the statute here concerned as a part
of the Uniform Sales Act, it was the clear intent of the legislature that, with
respect to foodstuffs, the implied warranty provision therein contained should
inure to the benefit of any ultimate purchaser or consumer of food; and it was not
intended that a strict 'privity of contract' would be essential for the bringing of an
action by such ultimate consumer for an asserted breach of the implied warranty."
-o Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918);
Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 Atl. 314 (1908); Freeman v.
Schultz Bread Co., 100 Misc. 528, 163 N. Y. Supp. 396 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1916);
Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R. I. 43, 144 AtI. 884 (1929) ; PROSSEa,
TORTS, 673-678 (1941).
2 E.g., Reichert Milling Co. v. George, 230 Ala. 3, 162 So. 393 (1934) ; Eisen-
geiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P. 2d 162 (1933); Paolinelli v. Dainty Foods
Manufacturers, 322 Ill. App. 586, 54 N. E. 2d 759 (1944) ; Nehi Bottling Co. v.
Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S. W. 2d 701 (1930) ; Doyle v. Continental Baking Co.,
262 Mass. 516, 160 N. E. 325 (1928) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178
Tenn. 405, 158 S. W. 2d 721 (1942); Campbell Soup Co. v. Davis, 163 Va. 89, 175
S. E. 743 (1934).
" E.g., Donaldson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 186 Ga. 870, 199 S. E.
213 (1938); Salzano v. First National Stores, 268 App. Div. 993, 51 N. Y. S. 2d
645 (1944); Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N. E. 283
(1924); Doherty v. S. S. Kresge Co., 227 Wis. 661, 278 N. W. 437 (1938).
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stances.2 3 The latter rule has been strictly applied,2 4 and the evidence
required under either theory is often impossible to secure.25
Thus, in the vast majority of North Carolina cases the plaintiff is
able to establish his cause of action only on the implied warranty, and
only against the retailer. If the retailer cannot or oes not join his
vendor, and is himself judgment proof, as frequently may be the case,
there is no practical remedy left to the plaintiff. However, the aban-
donment of the requirement of privity,26 indicated by the dictum in
the principal case, will make the manufacturer, all middlemen, and the
retailer liable for injuries resulting from unwholesome products sold by
them.2 7 This will give the injured plaintiff an opportunity to select as
" Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Henderson v. Munn, 99 F. 2d 190 (4th Cir. 1938) ;
Enloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N. C. 305, 180 S. E. 582 (1935) (Contains
a summary of the North Carolina rules in negligence actions of this type.) ; Davis
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 228 N. C. 32, 44 S. E. 2d 337 (1947) (bursting bottle) ;
Woody v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 218 N. C. 217, 10 S. E. 2d 706 (1940) (oily
substance in bottle); Tickle v. Hobgood, 216 N. C. 221, 4 S. E. 2d 444 (1939)
(decomposed animal flesh in bottle) ; Smith v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 213 N. C.
544, 196 S. E. 822 (1938) (shattered glass in bottle); Hampton v. Bottling Co.,
208 N. C. 331, 180 S. E. 584 (1935) (substance in bottle resembling paint);
Corum v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 N. C. 213, 171 S. E. 78 (1933) (fish-
hook in tobacco plug) ; Perry v. Bottling Co., 196 N. C. 175, 145 S. E. 14 (1928)
(shattered glass in bottle) ; Lamb v. Boyles, 192 N. C. 542, 135 S. E. 464 (1926);
Note, 15 N. C. L. REv. 430 (1937).2 See, e.g., Evans v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 216 N. C. 716, 6 S. E. 2d 510
(1940) (Where plaintiff was injured by drinking a soft drink containing a lethal
portion of arsenic, evidence that the bottle was "crooked" so that proper cleansing
was impossible was held improperly admitted) ; McCarn v. 3-Centa Bottling Com-
pany, 213 N. C. 543, 196 S. E. 837 (1938) (Nonsuit held proper where plaintiff's
only evidence was that he became ill from soft drink containing sediment and
"slimy-appearing" substance); Collins v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 209 N. C. 821,
184 S. E. 834 (1936) (Admission of evidence as to other deleterious substances in
soft drinks manufactured by defendant was held error since there was no evidence
of the time when the manufacturer sold the other bottles to dealers) ; Enloe v.
Bottlirg Co., 208 N. C. 305, 180 S. E. 582 (1935) (where plaintiff was injured by
drinking a coca-cola containing a rat; evidence of glass in another coca-cola manu-
factured by defendant was held improperly admitted).
2r DicxERsoN', PRODUCTS LIABrLITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER, 70-72 (1951),
where it is pointed out that in negligence actions, the successful plaintiff is com-
paratively rare, either because there was no negligence, or no proof of negligence,
or the food was in its original sealed container thereby releasing the retailer.
2' The abandonment spoken of would, in all probability, be a complete aban-
donment, thus allowing the injured consumer, although not the purchaser of the
food, to sue any or all of the prior vendors. But cf. the new UNIFORM CONMER-
CIAL CODE, final draft of 1951, section 2-318, which contains the provision: "A
warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person whose rela-
tienship to the buyer is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such person
may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section." Comment 4 under this section indicates that the warranty would extend
directly from the manufacturer to the consumer. However, the language of the
section is susceptible of the interpretation that its only effect is to allow the war-
ranty to extend from the purchaser's vendor, usually a retailer, to such reasonably
anticipated consumers. The latter interpretation is perhaps the intent of the
drafters since the final proposed draft of 1951 omitted sections 2-718 and 2-719 of
the 1950 proposed draft which together would have expressly authorized suit by
the iniured consumer against any vendor in the line of distribution. See note, 26
N. Y. U. L. REv. 352 (1951).
" PRossER, TORTS, 669-673, 688-691 (1941).
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a defendant the one most responsible financially, or to bring action
against all as joint defendants, thus increasing the probability of col-
lection of any damages, and in many cases preventing circuity of ac-
tions.28 Such a principle is recognized in negotiable instruments law
in actions by a holder against prior parties,2 9 and in real property law
in actions by a grantee against all prior grantors for breach of certain
covenants contained in the prior deeds.30
The abandonment of the privity requirement, in addition to greatly
aiding an injured plaintiff, might have the incidental but desirable effect
of forcing greater care by the manufacturer, and greater discrimination
and inspection in selection of the product by the middleman and retailer.
WALKER Y. WORTH, JR.
Wills-Per Stirpes or Per Capita Division
The difficult problem of determining the dispositive intent expressed
in an ambiguous will has reappeared in North Carolina. The testator,
in a will prepared by a layman, directed that "the remainder of my
estate is to be equally divided among my legal heirs, including said
Myrtle Coppedge Bunn, equally, share and share alike as provided by
laws of North Carolina." A brother, a half brother, eleven children of
a deceased brother and a deceased sister, and two children of a deceased
nephew were involved in the action to determine if the estate was to be
divided per capita or per stirpes. Held (one justice dissenting) that
the estate should be divided into fifteen equal shares, a per capita
distribution.'
Courts have been called on many times to interpret wills using simi-
lar language. As a result, certain phrases have been singled out as
being indicative of the testator's intention. As a general rule, a per
capita division is favored unless the will shows a contrary intent.2 When
_' If action is brought against the manufacturer in the first instance circuity is
prevented since there will be no possibility of a purchaser-retailer action, retailer-
wholesaler action, and wholesaler-manufacturer action. Or if all are joined, cir-
cuity may be avoided by the retailer or wholesaler obtaining a judgment over
against the manufacturer in the same suit.
2'8 AAt. JUR., Bills and Notes §942 (1938).
30 Wiggins v. Pender, 132 N. C. 628, 634, 44 S. E. 362, 364 (1903) quoting with
approval from Spencer's Case, 1 Smith, L. C. (9th ed.) 174: ". . . [the] covenant
of warranty binds the original grantor and his personal representatives to the
owner of the land, and any owner during whose possession a breach occurs can
sue any or all previous covenantors ... "; 14 Am. JuR., Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions §50 (1938).
1 Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234 N. C. 173, 66 S. E. 2d 777 (1951) Justice Johnson,
dissenting, was of the opinion that the will should be construed to require a per
stirpes distribution. Id at 178, 66 S. E. 2d at 781.
'Burton v. Cahill, 192 N. C. 505, 135 S. E. 332 (1926); Ex parte Brogden,
180 N. C. 157, 104 S. E. 177 (1920); Howell v. Tyler, 91 N. C. 213 (1884) ; Brit-
ton v. Miller, 63 N. C. 268 (1869); Bryant v. Scott, 21 N. C. 155 (1835); 69
C. J. §1312 (1951).
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such phrases as "to be equally divided," "share and share alike," etc.,
are the only indications in the will as to how the estate is to be appor-
tioned, they normally import a desire that each individual take an equal
share.3 However, they can just as easily be interpreted to mean an
equal division among classes 4 particularly where the beneficiaries stand
in unequal degrees of relationship.5 Use of the words "legal heirs"
points to a per stirpes distribution according to the intestate succession
laws;6 but, the coupling of expressions of equality with these words
changes the presumption to favor giving each individual the same share.7
A general reference in the will to the intestacy statutes, for example,
"according to the laws of the state," in the situation where those claim-
ing are of unequal degrees of kinship to the testator, indicates a desire
to have the beneficiaries take by classes.8 Here again, expressions of
equality change this presumption to support a per capita apportionment.
Irrespective of the use of such phrases, that desire which seems to pre-
dominate throughout the entire instrument,10 as related to the surround-
ing circumstances which may have influenced the testator at the time it
was written,11 will be the decisive factor.
The problem of construing wills containing various combinations of
the foregoing phrases has been faced many times in North Carolina.
As might be expected, there has never been any one will presented to
our court which contained all of the prominent features of the instrument
in the instant case. At first glance, the decision allowing each of the
interested parties to take the same portion seems to be a reiteration of
'Re Rauschenplaut, 212 Cal. 33, 297 Pac. 882 (1931) ; Dollander v. Dhaemers,
297 Ill. 274, 130 N. E. 705 (1921) ; Tillman v. O'Briant, 220 N. C. 714, 18 S. E.
2d 131 (1942) ; Burton v. Cahill, 192 N. C. 505, 135 S. E. 332 (1926) ; it rc Asby,
232 Wis. 481, 287 N. W. 734 (1939).
'Raymond v. Hillhouse, 45 Conn. 467, 29 Am. Rep. 688 (1878); Runyan v.
Rivers, 99 Ind. App. 680, 192 N. E. 327 (1934) ; Freund v. Schilling, 222 Mo. App.
901, 6 S. W. 2d 678 (1928) ; Burgin v. Patton, 58 N. C. 425 (1860); Rogers v.
Brickhouse, 58 N. C. 301 (1860).
Murphy v. Fox, 334 Ill. App. 7, 78 N. E. 2d 337 (1948) ; Bear v. Pitzer, 131
W. Va. 374, 47 S. E. 2d 219 (1948).
'Stephens v. Clark, 211 N. C. 84, 189 S. E. 191 (1936) ; 69 C. J. §1316.
'Dennis v. Shirley, 212 Ky. 114, 278 S. W. 691 (1925); Doherty v. Grady,
105 Me. 36, 52 A 869 (1908) ; Wooten v. Outland, 226 N. C. 245, 37 S. E. 2d 682
(1946).( Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lotbrop, 276 Mass. 469, 177 N. E. 675 (1931) ; In re
Ware, 173 Misc. 316, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 693 (1940); Croom v. Herring, 11 N. C.
393 (1826).
' Proctor v. Lacy, 263 Mass. 1, 160 N. E. 441 (1928); 57 AMt. JuR. §1229
(1948).1 1 In re Carrol, 62 Cal. App. 2d 798, 45 P. 2d 644 (1944) ; MacGregor v. Roux,
198 Ga. 520, 32 S. E. 2d 289 (1944) ; Patchell v. Groom, 158 Md. 10, 43 A. 2d 32
(1945) ; House v. House, 231 N. C. 218, 56 S. E. 2d 695 (1949) ; Schaeffer v.
Haseltine, 228 N. C. 484, 46 S. E. 2d 463 (1948).
" Shackelford v. Kauffman, 263 Ky. 676, 93 S. W. 2d 15 (1936) ; In re Thomp-
son, 202 Minn. 648, 279 N. W. 574 (1938) ; House v. House, 231 N. C. 218, 56 S. E.
2d 695 (1949); Schaeffer v. Haseltine, 228 N. C. 484, 46 S. E. 2d 463 (1948);
Ward v. Ottley, 166 Va. 639, 186 S. E. 25 (1936).
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the prevailing rule in this jurisdiction. 12 Perhaps, however, a more
&letailed survey is necessary.
In nearly all of the cases cited as applying the general rule, an equal
division was indicated among those who were specifically named in the
will,' 3 and in two instances all the beneficiaries who were to take equally
stood in the same degree of relationship to the testator.14 These cases
required no outside reference to the statute of distributions or canons
of descent to determine who was to share the estate. It was obvious
who the testator intended should take equal shares; whereas, in the
present case, the beneficiaries were referred to only as "legal heirs."
There have been occasions when an outside reference was necessary.
The first time this situation arose, the phrase "equally divided between
my legal heirs" was construed as directing a per capita distribution
among those standing in unequal degrees of relationship to the testator.x5
It might be noted that two subsequent cases involving similar language
and circumstances held directly contra to this decision.' 6 Then, in the
1" "The general rule in this jurisdiction is to the effect that where an equal
division is directed among heirs, or a class of beneficiaries, even though such class
of beneficiaries may be described as heirs of deceased persons, heirs or children of
living persons, the beneficiaries take per capita and not per stirpes." Wooten v.
Outland, 226 N. C. 245, 37 S. E. 2d 682 (1946).
1 Stowe v. Ward, 10 N. C. 604 (1824) ("be as equally divided amongst the
heirs of my brother, John Ford, the heirs of my sister, Nanny Stowe, the heirs
of my sister, Sally Ward, deceased, and nephew, Levi Ward") ; Bryant v. Scott,
21 N. C. 155 (1835) ("to be equally divided among the persons hereafter named"
and then went on to name them); Hastings v. Earp, 62 N. C. 5 (1866) ("to be
equally divided amongst all of the legatees named in the will, except the Masons,"
where the legatees had been previously named) ; Waller v. Forsyth, 62 N. C. 353
(1866) ("to be equally divided between the children of the said Nancy Waller
and my sons, William and John") ; Britton v. Miller, 63 N. C. 268 (1869) ("to
the children of my brother, Stephen W. Britton, and of my sister, Mary Miller...
to them and their heirs forever") ; Culp v. Lee, 109 N. C. 675, 14 S. E. 74 (1891)
(the "surplus shall be equally divided and paid over to Phillip J. Russell, Miss
Mary Russell and the children of my niece, Martha ... in equal portion, share
and share alike") ; Everett v. Griffin, 174 N. C. 106, 93 S. E. 474 (1917) ("the
proceeds . . .shall be equally divided between all my children") ; Legett v. Simp-
son, 176 N. C. 3, 96 S. E. 638 (1918) ("to the lawful children of my nieces, Eliza-
beth Bateman and Charlotte Baxter") ; Ex parte Brogden, 180 N. C. 157, 104
S. E. 177 (1920) ("to be equally divided between my two sisters' children" and
then specifically named those children) ; Burton v. Cahill, 192 N. C. 505, 135 S. E.
332 (1926) ("to said Annie L. Burton and Katie L. Cahill and their children") ;
Tillman v. O'Briant, 220 N. C. 714, 18 S. E. 2d 131 (1941) ("the proceeds divided
equally between Maggie Rhew's children and Lou Bettie O'Briant and Dewey
Yarboro") ; Wooten v. Outland, 226 N. C. 245, 27 S. E. 2d 682 (1946) ("to be
equally divided among the heirs of Uncle Gus Moseley, Uncle Lam Moseley,
Aunt Florence Patrick, Aunt Laune Jackson and Aunt Darlie Kilpatrick").
" Shull v. Johnson, 55 N. C. 202 (1855) ; Hill v. Spruill, 39 N. C. 244 (1846).
1 "It is also my will . .. [that] the proceeds [be] equally divided between
my legal heirs." The statute of distributions was used as a guide for the sole
purpose of determining who were the "legal heirs." The phrase "equally divided"
was held to direct the manner of apportionment of the estate. Freeman v. Knight,
37 N. C. 72 (1841).
" In Rogers v. Brickhouse, 58 N. C. 301 (1860) ("to be equally divided among
his heirs at law") ; and in Burgin v. Patton, 58 N. C. 425 (1860) ("to be equally
divided amongst my heirs except John Burgin"), a per stirpes distribution was
ordered.
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next opinion on this exact problem, these two cases were completely
ignored and once again a per capita apportionment was ordered.' 7 Only
one early case involved a direct reference to the intestate succession
laws,' 8 but the phrasing so clearly indicated that statutory apportion-
ment was to be followed that it can hardly be considered as in point
here.
Purely as a matter of grammatical construction, the correct inter-
pretation of the clause involved in the principal case 19 would seem to be
that urged by the dissenting opinion.2 ° This is emphasized by the fact
that the clause, read as it is written, seems to demand that reference be
made to the intestate succession laws to determine both the question of
who takes (i.e., who are the "legal heirs") and the question of what
share is to be taken. The majority opinion rea~ds the clause to mean that
reference is to be made to the intestate succession laws to determine
only the question of who are the "legal heirs," which seems to take the
phrase, "as provided by laws of North Carolina," out of context. This
is particularly so in view of the fact that our court has previously held
that the words "legal heirs" standing alone mean the same thing as
"legal heirs as provided by the laws of North Carolina." From this
technical standpoint, the better view would probably be that the intestate
succession laws should be controlling to demand a per stirpes distribu-
tion in this situation.
Perhaps the obvious answer to all of this is that these technicalities
just do not apply. More than likely, the layman drawing this will
utilized the phrase "as provided by laws of North Carolina" only to
give the will what he might think of as "legal dignity." After all, here
was a man who probably knew nothing whatsoever about the legal dis-
tinctions set forth in our intestate succession laws. He probably never
heard the words per capita or per stirpes. If it can be said that the
technical construction given this will by both the majority and dissent-
ing opinions is not the controlling factor, then one more important con-
sideration favoring a stirpital distribution remains.
Under ordinary circumstances, it would not be probable that the
average person would intend that his grandnephew should have the same
"In Hackney v. Griffin, 59 N. C. 381 (1863) the court agreed with Freeman
v. Knight 37 N. C. 72 (1841) and held that "to be equally divided between all my
legal heirs" directed a per capita division of the estate. It is interesting to note
that Justice Battle, who wrote the opinions in Rogers v. Brickhouse, 58 N. C. 301(1860) and Burgin v. Patton 58 N. C. 425 (1860), and who was still a member of
the court, did not dissent in Hackney v. Griffin. For a more complete discussion,
see Long, Class Gifts in North Carolina, 22 N. C. L. REv. 297, 320 (1944).
" "... to be divided among all my legal heirs, agreeable to the statute of dis-
tributions of intestates' estates," Croom v. Herring, 11 N. C. 393, 394 (1826).
" ". . . to be equally divided among my legal heirs . . . equally, share and
share alike as provided by laws of North Carolina." Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234
N. C. 173, 176, 66 S. E. 2d 777, 781 (1951).
20 Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234 N. C. 173, 178, 66 S. E. 2d 777, 781 (1951).
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share of his estate as his brother.21 Yet, that is the result reached by
the majority. It would seem more probable, in view of "the degree of
consanguinity to the testator," that each class of beneficiaries instead of
each individual was to have an equal share. In the case of an ambiguous
will where sufficient evidence was not available as to the testator's true
intention, would it not be better to allow this objective standard to
prevail ?
Because of the many factors which can influence the drawing of a
will of this character, and the resulting difficulty in construing it, per-
haps both the majority and dissenting view can be justified. By this
decision, it would seem that where the phrase in question contains ex-
pressions of equality, a per stirpes distribution will be reached only if
there is explicit language indicating such an intent.
MORTON L. UNION.
Wills-Requirement of Signatory Intent
Testator's attested will, written entirely in the hand of one of the
witnesses thereto, was offered for probate. Her name appeared only
twice in the instrument, thus:
"Will of Hannah Williams, Sr.
Garysburg, North Carolina.
. . [Provisions of Will].
"We certify that Hannah Williams, Sr., was in her sound mind.
"... [date].
[Signatures of Witnesses]"
The scrivener-witness testified that he "put it [the name at the top]
in there to identify who she [testator] was and where she lived." The
court held the name appearing at the top to be a sufficient "signing,"
and declared the instrument a valid will.'
The original Wills Act 2 in England did not require that the will be
signed by the testator if it was properly reduced to writing.8 Later,
the Statute of Frauds4 provided that the will be "signed by the party so
devising the same or by some other person in his presence and by his
express directions." Lemyne v. Stanley5 interpreted this to mean that
-" "Where the question is in the balance of doubt, the doubt is to be resolved
in favor of a taking per stirpes rather than per capita. One reason for this pref-
erence is that such a taking is in accord with the laws of descent and in accord
with the natural instinct of testators." Claude v. Schutt, 211 Iowa 117, 233 N. W.
41 (1930), cited in dissenting opinion in Coppedge v. Coppedge, 234 N. C. 173,
179, 66 S. E. 2d 777, 781 (1951).
'In re Will of Hannah Williams, 234 N. C. 228, 66 S. E. 2d 902 (1951).
2 32 Hen. VIII c. 1 (1540).
2 Brown v. Sackville, 1 Dyer 72a (1553).
'29 Car. II c. 3 §5 (1677).
'3 Lev. 1 (1681).
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when the testator's name appeared in the body of the will, in his own
handwriting, it was sufficiently "signed." The present English statute,0
passed as a result of this case, 7 requires that a will be signed at the end.
In this country the statutory requirements of different states vary.
Where the statute merely requires that the will be in writing and signed,
it is uniformly held that it is immaterial where the signature is placed,
provided it can be established that it was attached with the intent to
authenticate the instrument. As to the type of evidence necessary to
prove the intent of the testator the courts are sharply divided. One
line of cases holds that intent may be inferred from the declarations of
the testator and circumstances attendant upon the execution of the
document.8 A second group of cases rests on the theory that the intent
of the testator to adopt his name as his signature must be manifest upon
the face of the will if the name appears elsewhere than at the end.9
Under the latter theory the mere fact that the testator's name appears
at the top or beginning of the will,' 0 on the back,'- or on the envelope
in which the will is contained, 12 is not a sufficient signing to validate the
will.
Several states, in order to prevent fraudulent additions to wills and
to make the testators intent more apparent, require that the testator
"sign at the end" or "subscribe" his name. These statutes have not
eliminated the problem, since difficult questions of fact as to the
intent of the testator have been replaced by equally difficult questions
of law as to the legal effect of the word "end."'1  Because of the large
'7 Win. IV and 1 Vict. c. 26 (1837).T ROLLISO TON WILLS §97 (1939); ROOD ON WILLS §257 (2d ed. 1926).
'Armstrong v. Armstrong, 29 Ala. 538 (1857) ; Meads v. Earle, 205 Mass.
553, 91 N. E. 916 (1910); In re Thomas' Estate, 243 Mich. 566, 220 N. W. 764
(1928); Stone v. Holden, 221 Mich. 430, 191 N. W. 238 (1922); In re Phelan,
82 N. J. Eq. 316, 87 Atl. 625 (1913).
o In re Manchester, 174 Cal. 417, 163 Pac. 358 (1917); Timoney v. Booth, 127
N. Y. 109, 27 N. E. 826 (1891).
"0 Meany v. Priddy, 127 Va. 84, 102 S. E. 470 (1920); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 54
Va. (13 Gratt.) 664 (1857).
" Roy v. Roy, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 418 (1863).
"Warwick v. Warwick, 86 Va. 596, 10 S. E. 843 (1890). But cf. Alexander
v. Johnson, 171 N. C. 468, 88 S. E. 785 (1916).
"See, Bond, When Is a Will Signed "At the End"?, 9 MICH. L. REV. 342
(1910). The authorities are in accord that it is not necessary that one signing a
will affix his legal or true name, In re Southerlands Will, 188 N. C. 325, 124 S. E.
632 (1924), and, where it is established that the signature is really that of the
testator, Cartwright v. Cartwright, 158 Ark. 278, 250 S. W. 11 (1923), and it
appears that he intended it to be a token of complete execution, the fact that he
signs his first name, Knox's Estate, 131 Pa. 220, 18 Atl. 1021 (1890), an abbrevia-
tion of his name, Cartwright v. Cartwright, supra, or merely his initials, Barnes
v. Home, 233 S. W. 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Pilcher v. Pilcher, 117 Va. 356,
84 S. E. 667 (1915), will not render it invalid. Nor will it be invalid if it be
signed "father," In re Kimmel's Estate, 278 Pa. 435, 123 AtI. 405 (1924), or
"mother," In re Henderson's Estate, 196 Cal. 623, 238 Pac. 938 (1925) ; In re
Southerlands Will, supra; "Brother Alex," Wise v. Short, 181 N. C. 320, 107 S. E.




number of wills that have been held invalid on this point, although no
question of their genuineness was raised, it has been said that "the
remedy has proved in practice far worse than the disease."' 4
In North Carolina attested wills must be "signed" by the testator
and "subscribed" by the witnesses; holographic wills must be "sub-
scribed" by the testator or the testator's name "inserted in some part of"
the will.15 The Supreme Court has consistently held that the signature
of the testator to a holographic or attested will may appear at any place
on the instrument, but the subscription of a witness must appear at the
end.16
For many years the North Carolina Court required a showing of
signatory intent on the part of a testator. 17 But, in 1934, the case of
In re Will of Rowland'3 apparently abrogated this requirement, at least
as to holographic wills. There, an otherwise unsigned paper writing,
entirely in the hand of the testator, contained the following clause: "I
do hrby give W A Rowlal on the North west forner oo sad land of H L
Rowled this being my will. .. ." [Emphasis added.] The court held
that the statute only required that the name be "inserted in" some part
of the will and that this writing fully satisfied such requirement. It
Matter of Andrews, 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 394 at 401 (1857).15N. C. Gm. STAT. §31-3 (1943) : "No last will or testament shall be good or
sufficient, ... unless [it] . . . shall have been written in the testator's lifetime,
and signed by hint, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction,
and subscribed in his presence by two witnesses at least, ...or unless such last
will and testament be found among the valuable papers and effects of any deceased
person, or *shall have been lodged in the hands of any person for safekeeping, and
the same shall be in the handwriting of such deceased person, with his ivime
subscribed thereto or inserted in some part of such will. . ."
"
0Alexander v. Johnston, 171 N. C. 468, 88 S. E. 785 (1916); Peace v. Ed-
wards, 170 N. C. 64, 86 S. E. 807 (1915); Burriss v. S.tarr, 165 N. C. 657, 81
S. E. 929 (1914); Boger v. Cedar Cove Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 557, 81 S. E. 784
(1914); Richards v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 158 N. C. 54, 73 S. E. 485 (1911);
Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 184, 49 S. E. 104 (1904) ; Devereux v. McMahan,
108 N. C. 134, 12 S. E. 902 (1891). Where the testator signs the will subsequent
to the signing of the witnesses there is a split of authority as to the validity of
the will. One line of cases holds that to witness a future event is equally impos-
sible whether it occur the next moment or the next week. Brooks v. Woodson,
87 Ga. 379, 13 S. E. 712 (1891); In re Kahl's Estate, 278 Mich. 561, 270 N. W.
787 (1936). Another view is that the witnessing of a will constitutes two separate
acts, the subscribing of the name being manual and the attesting being a mental
process; there is no need that they be simultaneous. Therefore, when the testator
signs after the witness has subscribed and the witness sees him sign, then the at-
testation is complete. Bloechle v. Davis, 132 Ohio 415, 8 N. E. 2d 247 (1937),
11 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 390 (testator signed four days after witness). A third
theory, which seems to be the one followed in North Carolina, is that where the
parties sign in the presence of each other, so close together in point of time as to
constitute the same transaction, it is immaterial which one signed first. Cutler
v. Cutler, 130 N. C. 1, 40 S. E. 689 (1902). But see, In re Will of Pope, 139
N. C. 484, 486, 52 S. E. 235, 236 (1905) ; In re Will of Franks, 231 N. C. 252, 256,
56 S. E. 2d 668, 670 (1949).
" Burriss v. Starr, 165 N. C. 657, 81 5. E. 929 (1914); Boger v. Cedar Cove
Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 557, 81 S. E. 784 (1914) ; Richards v. W. M. Ritter Lum-
ber Co., 158 N. C. 54, 73 S. E. 485 (1911).
1 206 N. C. 456, 174 S. E. 284 (1934), appearing also in 202 N. C. 373, 162 S. E.
897 (1932).
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would seem to follow from this that if by chance the testator's name
appears at any place in the will, it may be probated.
The instant case, in holding that the name of testator written by
the scrivener-witness was sufficiently signed, seems to have accomplished
the same result as to attested wills. Basing its decision upon a twofold
line of reasoning, the court first looked to the long line of cases holding
that the signature of a testator may appear at any place on the instru-
ment.1 9 Then, by applying the statute,20 which provides that the sign-
ing may be by another if made in the testator's presence and at his
direction, the court concluded that the signature by another could also
appear at any place on the instrument. This reasoning is sound only if
the placing of the name by the other is intended by the testator to be
his signature. For, in all the cases cited in support of the court's rea-
soning, the name was placed on the instrument in the handwriting of
the testator with apparent signatory intent31 As the decision was not
based upon any theory of the testator's intent, and as the cases cited
do not necessarily support the reasoning, the requirement of such intent
in attested wills is apparently abolished.
If the name is so placed on the instrument as to make it uncertain
whether the testator intended the signature to be his final and conclu-
sive act, then further and satisfactory evidence of such intent should
perhaps be required. This could be accomplished by a provision in the
Wills Act requiring that the name appear in a holographic or attested
will "in such a manner as to make it manifest that the name was intended
as a signature. 22
J. KNOX WALKER.
"In re Will of Goodman, 229 N. C. 444, 50 S. E. 2d 34 (1948); Paul v.
Davenport, 217 N. C. 154, 7 S. E. 2d 352 (1940) ; Corp. Comm. v. Wilkerson, 201
N. C. 344, 160 S. E. 292 (1931) ; cases cited note 16 supra.
2 See note 15 supra.
21 See note 19 supra.
-'See Code of Va. §64-51 (1950).
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